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INTRODUCTION

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, more than
ten thousand rescue and cleanup workers brought individual lawsuits
against New York City for respiratory and other illnesses they
developed after working in the ruins of the World Trade Center. After
years of litigation, the parties put together a comprehensive
settlement in 2010. The defendant agreed to pay a total of $625
million so long as 95% of the plaintiffs accepted the terms of the
settlement. If 100% of the plaintiffs signed on, however, the defendant
was willing to increase the total settlement amount to be shared
among all the plaintiffs to $712.5 million.' In other words, to get the
In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
1.
World Trade Center Litigation Settlement Process Agreement, As Amended §§ II.A, IV, VI.E
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last 5% of plaintiffs to sign on, the defendant was willing to pay a
substantial premium-more than twice the per-claimant amount for
the first 95%. But, because the plaintiffs could get only 95.1% of their
ranks to participate by the deadline, they left up to $87.5 million on
the table. 2
Why did the plaintiffs fail to maximize the collective value of
their claims? Looking to property theory, I argue, can help us
understand. As this Article will explain, there is an "anticommons"
problem in aggregate litigation.3
A tragedy of the anticommons occurs when property rights are
fragmented. Many owners have the power to block the most efficient
use of a resource, but no one has the right to use it without obtaining
permission from all the others.4 In such a dynamic, transaction costs
and strategic holdout behavior can prevent the owners from
assembling dispersed property rights into a bundle more valuable
than the sum of its parts.
Aggregate litigation exhibits the same dynamic. Defendants
want peace, and they are often willing to pay for it. Plaintiffs therefore
may stand to gain if they can package all of their claims together and
sell them to the defendant (i.e., settle) as a single unit; that is, they
can charge a premium for total peace. But, because the rights to
control those claims are dispersed among many individual plaintiffs,
aggregating them into a more valuable collective can be difficult.
(Mar. 11, 2010) [hereinafter World Trade Settlement], available at http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/
cases/show.php?db=911&id=540.

2.

See Mireya Navarro, Sept. 11 Workers Agree to Settle Health Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES,

Nov. 19, 2010, at Al; see also infra note 56 (discussing subsequent developments in case).
3.
That aggregate litigation exhibits features of "commons" problems has not gone
unnoticed in the literature. See Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV.
1059, 1085-87 (2012) (noting that mismatch between the scale of resource ownership and the
scale of most efficient use can lead to commons and anticommons situations in mass tort
litigation and arguing that asymmetric stakes between plaintiffs and defendants are best
understood as a tragedy of commons where plaintiffs underinvest in enforcing law through the
tort system); Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L. REV. 1721,
1722, 1747-50 (2002) (arguing that asbestos defendants' assets constitute a limited common-pool
resource and current plaintiffs are rationally overgrazing to the detriment of future plaintiffs);

Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of Opt-Out
Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 96-97, 125 (1997) (arguing that mass
litigation has two kinds of "tragedy of the commons effects": (1) costs of multiple trials are
externalities on other litigants and the judicial system that individual claimants have no
incentive to limit, and (2) defendant's assets form a "common pool" if insufficient to satisfy all
claims). While others have applied the "commons/anticommons" framework to some of the
collective action and free riding problems in mass tort litigation, my focus here is on an
analytically distinct problem: the anticommons dynamic that makes it difficult for parties to
craft comprehensive settlements that could leave both sides better off in aggregate litigation.

4.

Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from

Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624, 674 (1998).
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In some circumstances, plaintiffs can use the class action
mechanism to offer defendants peace. But the class action has become
less and less practical for resolving many types of large-scale
aggregate litigation, such as mass torts.5 Attention has increasingly
turned to nonclass aggregate settlements where the parties attempt to
resolve claims in bulk, even though the plaintiffs are pursuing
formally separate lawsuits.
To obtain peace outside of the class action, the defendant must
buy it from each individual plaintiff because each plaintiff retains
ultimate control over the decision whether and on what terms to
settle. Indeed, the legal ethics rules governing aggregate settlements
in all fifty states require such fragmentation of control by barring
plaintiffs from relinquishing autonomy over settlement decisions.
Thus, even as the handful of specialized plaintiffs firms that represent
the vast majority of plaintiffs in mass litigation attempt to negotiate
large-scale aggregate settlements, they are hampered by their
inability to guarantee defendants that every plaintiff will sign on.
In recent efforts to set forth principles to regulate nonclass
aggregate settlements, the American Law Institute ("ALI") recognized
that the traditional "aggregate settlement rule"-which requires a
lawyer attempting to settle claims in bulk to obtain each client's
individual consent after disclosing all the terms of the deal, including
every other client's share in the settlement-can be an obstacle to
comprehensive settlements.6 The rule empowers any single plaintiff to
hold up a global deal by refusing to participate once the deal's terms
have been negotiated. Thus in the most controversial (and perhaps
5.
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct 2541, 2546, 2551-52, 2561 (2011)
(refusing class certification to one and a half million female plaintiffs in employment
discrimination case on grounds of insufficient commonality); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815, 864 (1999) (invalidating certification of limited fund settlement class as global resolution of
asbestos litigation); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (invalidating
certification of asbestos settlement class action because of problems with commonality and
adequacy of representation); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus and
Individual Consent, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 507 (2011) (noting shift away from class

actions); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 (2005) (highlighting flaws in mass tort class
actions and suggesting the gradual demise of these class actions in practice); Robert H. Klonoff,
The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2038985
(arguing that courts have
recently restricted availability of class actions); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From

Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations:Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U.
KAN. L. REV. 775, 777 (2010) (examining potential shift from class actions to other forms of
aggregate litigation).
6.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2009) ("A lawyer who represents
two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement . . . unless each
client gives informed consent.").
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most important) recommendation in its Principles of the Law of
Aggregate Litigation, the ALI proposed modifying the aggregate
settlement rule in mass litigation.7 The ALI proposal would allow
plaintiffs sharing a common lawyer to agree in advance to be bound by
a supermajority vote on whether to accept a group settlement offer,
subject to judicial review for procedural and substantive fairness.8 By
effectively precommitting to be bound by a collective decision-that is,
by contractually aggregating their rights-a group of plaintiffs could
credibly offer the defendant what it wants: complete peace.
The ALI proposal, however, has drawn fire from several
prominent critics.9 These critics argue that allowing clients to transfer
their individual rights to accept or reject a settlement to a group
would leave clients vulnerable. Without individual control over their
claims, these critics say, clients would not be able to protect
themselves against inadequate settlements or unfair allocations
arranged by lawyers trying to appease the majority to get a deal done

7.

AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION

§§

3.15-3.18 (2010).

Samuel Issacharoff, the Reporter for the ALI Principles, described the proposal on nonclass
aggregate settlements as "probably the single greatest contribution of [the] project." Discussion
of Principlesof the Law of Aggregate Litigation, 86 A.L.I. PROC. 229, 269 (2009).
8.

AM. LAw INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION

§

3.17(b), (d), (e).

9.
See, e.g., Sybil L. Dunlop & Steven D. Maloney, Justice is Hard, Let's Go Shopping!
Trading Justice For Efficiency Under the New Aggregate Settlement Regime, 83 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 521, 556-57 (2009) (criticizing ALI proposal on the grounds that it "silence[s] those who are
the most likely to challenge the fundamental fairness of established law"); Howard M. Erichson
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 269 (2011) (critiquing
the ALI Principles' lawyer-empowerment idea in mass torts); Nancy J. Moore, The Absence of
Legal Ethics in the ALI's Principlesof the Law of Aggregate Litigation:A Missed Opportunityand More, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 717, 718 (2011) [hereinafter Moore, Absence of Legal Ethics]
(examining consequences of ALI proposal's failure to discuss legal ethics); Nancy J. Moore, The
American Law Institute's Draft Proposal to Bypass the Aggregate Settlement Rule: Do Mass Tort
Clients Need (Or Want) Group Decisionmaking?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 401 (2008) [hereinafter
Moore, Group Decisionmaking] (explaining ALI proposal problems relating to inadequacy of
disclosures to mass tort clients early in a case); Thomas D. Morgan, Client Representation us.
Case Administration: The ALI Looks at Legal Ethics Issues in Aggregate Settlements, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 734, 734 (2011) (arguing that the proposal is inadequate and conflicts with ABA
Model Rule 1.8(g)); Carol A. Needham, Advance Consent to Aggregate Settlements: Reflections on
Attorneys'FiduciaryObligationsand ProfessionalResponsibility Duties, 44 LOy. U. CHI. L.J. 511,
515 (2012) (characterizing the ALI proposal as a "wide-angle view" and reiterating the
importance of lawyer duties to each individual client). For criticism of an earlier proposal by
Charles Silver (Associate Reporter for the ALI Principles) and Lynn Baker to allow advance
waivers of the aggregate settlement rule, see, for example, Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the
ClassAction: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 570-71 [hereinafter Erichson, Beyond the Class Action]; Steve Baughman
Jensen, Like Lemonade, Ethics Comes Best When It's Old-Fashioned:A Response to Professor
Moore, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 215, 216 (1999); Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against Changing the
Aggregate Settlement Rule in Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 149, 181-82 (1999)
[hereinafter Moore, CaseAgainst].
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and collect a hefty fee.' 0 Further, critics contend that before the
settlement offer's terms are known, clients who retain lawyers to
pursue their individual cases cannot understand, and therefore
consent to, all of the conflicts of interest that will inevitably arise in
allocating a group settlement."
These critiques have intuitive appeal. The aggregate
settlement rule is aimed at preserving a one-on-one conception of
representation where the lawyer owes an undivided duty of loyalty to
each individual client. Rules that serve to bond lawyers as agents to
the principals they serve-their clients-are laudatory. And by
guaranteeing individual autonomy over the decision whether to settle,
the aggregate settlement rule assures each client that his or her
claims cannot be compromised on terms he or she finds unacceptable.
Autonomy empowers individual plaintiffs to protect themselves
against opportunism on the part of their lawyers and exploitation at
the hands of the majority by rejecting any settlement that would leave
them worse off.
But critics of the ALI proposal miss the larger dynamic. In
focusing on traditional notions of lawyer loyalty and client autonomy,
they have failed to appreciate the implications of the anticommons in
aggregate litigation. Sometimes surrendering autonomy can be
welfare enhancing-particularly when it offers a way out of the
anticommons. If plaintiffs can overcome the collective action problem
they face and credibly offer the defendant peace, they all stand to
gain.
This anticommons dynamic is far from unique. Similar
problems are present in many areas of law ranging from bankruptcy
to oil and gas unitization to sovereign debt restructuring. But instead
of slavishly insisting on individual autonomy, these bodies of law have
developed strategies to facilitate the value-generating aggregation of
rights, either by using state power to transfer rights to the collective
or by enforcing private agreements to be bound by group decisions.
Drawing on insight from these other contexts, this Article
argues that strategies for defeating an anticommons dynamic that
require parties to surrender their autonomy in order to achieve joint
gains can be legitimate. The challenge comes not in determining that
individuals should be permitted to pursue these joint gains, but
instead in designing a governance procedure capable of protecting the
interests of the individuals within the collective. In other words, the
legitimacy of any strategy that compels participation in the
10.
11.

See, e.g., Moore, Group Decisionmaking,supra note 9, at 406-09.
Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 298-311.
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aggregation of rights depends on the presence of procedures to ensure
that the resulting gains are fairly allocated and not simply
appropriated by the majority or agent.
Governance is thus the key to legitimizing attempts to defeat
the anticommons in mass litigation through aggregation, whether by
regulatory means, such as the class action, or by contractual
precommitments to group decisions on nonclass aggregate
settlements, as in the ALI proposal.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the
anticommons dynamic in aggregate litigation and identifies persistent
transaction costs that frustrate market attempts at aggregation.
Indeed, because formal legal obstacles like the aggregate settlement
rule prevent them from using contractual precommitment strategies
to overcome the anticommons, parties have sometimes resorted to
extralegal means to bundle claims and thus capture the surplus that
would otherwise go unrealized.
Part II presents the anticommons dynamic in aggregate
litigation as a two-stage problem in which the plaintiffs must, at the
first stage, aggregate their rights in order to maximize collective value
and then, at the second stage, divide up the resulting surplus in an
equitable manner. It argues that where coercion is used to compel
participation at stage one, that coercion must be legitimized through a
governance procedure at stage two that will ensure equitable
allocation and protect individuals from exploitation by their agents or
the majority.
Part III examines the strategies by which the law addresses
several other instances where splintered property rights could lead to
similar anticommons problems. It surveys a range of contexts,
including land use, admiralty, bankruptcy, oil and gas extraction,
intellectual property, and sovereign debt restructuring. Each of these
strategies has adopted the two-stage approach. At stage one they take
one of two forms: regulatory strategies where the power of the state is
used to transfer rights from individuals to the collective and
contractual strategies where parties voluntarily cede their autonomy
to a collective decisionmaking process. Regardless of its form,
however, each strategy incorporates procedural protections at the
second stage-the allocation phase-that help legitimize binding
individuals to the aggregation.
Finally, Part IV returns to the law of aggregate litigation and
applies lessons from property theory and approaches taken by other
areas of law. Part IV.A argues that the class action is a regulatory
solution to the anticommons in aggregate litigation and that
recognizing it as such sheds light on several features of class action
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law. Part IV.B argues that the ALI proposal to modify the aggregate
settlement rule-to essentially eliminate a state-imposed transaction
cost-is really a very modest step toward facilitating a partial
contractual solution to the anticommons in nonclass aggregate
litigation. It further argues that the procedural protections the ALI
proposal incorporates are sufficient to legitimize the loss of plaintiff
autonomy. It then offers suggestions for a more comprehensive
approach that would allow groups of clients with different lawyers to
agree to be bound by a collective decision on settlement.
I. THE ANTICOMMONS IN AGGREGATE LITIGATION

A. The Tragedy of the Anticommons
As Michael Heller has explained, the tragedy of the
anticommons is the mirror image of the classic tragedy of the
commons.12 A tragedy of the commons occurs when too many people
have access to a common resource and no one has a right to exclude
others.13 Because the users do not internalize all of the costs of their
uses, the resource is prone to overuse. Classic examples include
overgrazed fields, depleted fisheries, and polluted air. Assigning
private property rights in the resource, forcing each owner to
internalize externalities, is often thought of as a solution to the
tragedy of the commons.14
A tragedy of the anticommons, on the other hand, occurs when
there are too many property-rights holders; that is, too many owners
have a right to exclude others from using a resource at its most
efficient scale, and no one has an effective privilege of use, which often
leads to underuse.15 In other words, as Lee Anne Fennell succinctly
12. Heller, supra note 4, at 624; see also James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric
Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 1-2 (2000) (proposing a formal
economic model of the anticommons through comparison of commons with anticommons).
13. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
14. Michael A. Heller, Common Interest Developments at the Crossroadsof Legal Theory, 37
URB. LAw. 329, 330 (2005) (citing Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 AM.
EcON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 347 (1967)).
15. Id.; see also Frank I. Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Property, in
ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW: NOMOS XXIV, at 3, 6, 9 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1982) (positing an imaginary property regime that is the converse of a commons
where no person can make use of a resource without obtaining the permission of every other
person). Although typically associated with underuse, an anticommons can sometimes lead to
overuse when the rights to prevent activity are dispersed, as, for example, when difficulty
assembling contiguous parcels of land prevents the creation of a nature preserve. See Lee Anne
Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons, i7 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS
OF PROPERTY LAW 35, 42-43 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011).
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put it, because property rights are widely dispersed, "a valueenhancing assembly-one that could leave every party better off than
the status quo-will fail to occur as a result of strategic holdout
behavior and other transaction costs." 16
The classic example comes from early postsocialist Moscow
where kiosks filled with goods sprang up on the streets while newly
privatized storefronts sat empty.17 The problem was that the
transition government had not given any individual a bundle of rights
in the storefronts that reflected full ownership. Instead, it had
distributed fragmented rights to various socialist-era stakeholders,
dispersing the rights to sell, to lease, to receive revenue, to determine
use, and to occupy across a web of private, quasi-private, and
governmental entities.18 Thus, no single entrepreneur could set up
shop without first collecting the disaggregated rights from all the
other owners.
In a world without transaction costs, of course, people could
easily avoid tragedies of the commons or anticommons by trading
their rights.' 9 But in the real world, transaction costs exist. Not only
can it be costly to identify, locate, and negotiate with all of the various
rights holders, but some may act strategically and hold out for a
greater share of the assembly surplus. Thus the anticommons
dynamic that occurs when there are gains to be had from aggregating
rights into a useful collective, but rights are disaggregated among
many owners, can persist. 20
B. The Aggregate-LitigationAnticommons
The anticommons dynamic is present in many types of
aggregate litigation. When a number of plaintiffs have similar claims
16. Fennell, supra note 15, at 41. There is some dispute in the property literature about the
scope of the anticommons concept. Larissa Katz argues that a true anticommons exists only
where owners have independent but overlapping authority over the same resource, such that no
owner can act if the others do not simultaneously ratify the action, and the concept does not
apply to owners of separate but complementary goods whose spheres of authority do not overlap.
Larissa Katz, Red Tape and Gridlock, 23 CAN. J. L. & JUR. 99, 110, 117-18 (2010). Here, I adopt
a broader definition, more in line with Heller and Fennell, that an anticommons exists where
some uses of the resource are still possible, but its highest-value use (or use at the most efficient
scale) is blocked by the transaction costs that must be incurred to aggregate rights. Id. at 100 &
n.8; see also Fennell, supra note 15, at 41-42 ("The anticommons tragedy is an assembly
problem, nothing more and nothing less.").
17. Heller, supranote 4, at 622-23.
18. Id. at 635-39.
19. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 15 (1960).
20. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in BiomedicalResearch, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).
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against a common defendant, those claims are often worth more
bundled together than standing alone. But the rights to control those
claims are dispersed among the individual plaintiffs and may be
difficult to aggregate into a more valuable collective.
1. Aggregation Can Generate Value
Aggregation yields several benefits for plaintiffs. First,
plaintiffs can take advantage of economies of scale in developing their
cases. 21 Plaintiffs can share the (often considerable) costs of
investigation, discovery, and legal development of common issues of
law and fact, as well as other expenses like hiring expert witnesses.
These efficiencies allow plaintiffs to pursue what otherwise might be
negative-value claims. 22
Second, as a group, plaintiffs have enough money at stake that
they (and their lawyers) can rationally invest in the litigation on
something approaching the same scale as the defendant. 23 As a group,
plaintiffs can spread expenses over a portfolio of cases, allowing them
to rationally spend more on a trial in one case than it may yield
because they know they can recoup the expenses in the increased
settlement value of the other cases in the portfolio. And aggregation
helps mitigate the public-goods problem that might otherwise lead
plaintiffs to underinvest in the hope of a free ride on others' efforts to
develop common factual and legal issues. 24 This helps to equalize the
balance of power between individual plaintiffs and defendants who,
facing many claims, have natural economies of scale, opportunities to
spread costs, and incentives to invest in the litigation as a whole.

21. See, e.g., Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 9, at 545-50; Charles Silver &
Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733,
744-45 (1997).
22. See, e.g., Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supranote 9, at 545.
23. See, e.g., id. at 545-48 (explaining that leveling the playing field with defendants
requires a sufficient number of claims to justify expensive and time consuming litigation); Silver
& Baker, supra note 21, at 747 ("Aggregation brings the plaintiffs' and defendants' incentives to
invest in litigation more nearly into balance."); cf. David Rosenberg, Mandatory-LitigationClass
Actions: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 847-53 (2002) [hereinafter
Rosenberg, Only Option] (arguing that only mandatory class actions can truly allow plaintiffs to
invest in litigation on the same scale as defendants); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass
Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 570-72 (1987) (advocating
for mandatory class actions as a way to avoid exploitation of plaintiffs by defendants).
24. See Rosenberg, Only Option, supra note 23, at 847 (explaining that only complete
aggregation can address the collective action problem in mass torts); cf. Campos, supra note 3, at
1087 (arguing that not only development of common issues, but also "law enforcement in mass
tort litigation is a 'public good' ").
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And third, aggregation allows plaintiffs to share risk. Singleshot plaintiffs tend to be more risk averse than repeat-player
defendants. 25 Each plaintiff faces the undiversifiable risk of losing a
claim that might (at least in some personal-injury cases) be among his
or her largest assets. 26 Defendants, on the other hand, face a more
diversified portfolio of claims and are able to offload some risk onto
insurers, allowing them to take a more risk-neutral approach to the
litigation and drive a harder bargain in settlement negotiations. 27 By
aggregating their claims, plaintiffs can share some of the risk that
they might not prevail in their individual suits and help to balance
their risk profiles with that of the defendant. 28
Because of these benefits, aggregation tends to increase
plaintiffs' leverage in settlement negotiations with the defendant. 29
But complete or near-complete aggregation can create value for
defendants as well, if it allows for the final resolution of all the claims
against them. As a result, defendants are sometimes willing to pay a
premium for total peace.
There are several reasons why defendants might be willing to
pay a "peace premium" for a comprehensive settlement. The first is to
avoid adverse selection. Plaintiffs have both an informational
advantage and a first-mover advantage. They (and their lawyers) tend
to know more about the relative values of their own claims than
defendants, and they can threaten trial with their strongest cases and
voluntarily dismiss the weaker ones as trial dates approach. If a group
settlement is incomplete-that is, if individual plaintiffs are allowed
to elect whether or not to participate-there is a danger that those
with the strongest claims will opt out and free ride on work done by

25. See Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance:A Market Solution to a ProceduralProblem,
99 GEO. L.J. 65, 83-89 (2010) (arguing that willingness of repeat players to accept trial risks
gives them greater bargaining power); Silver & Baker, supra note 21, at 748 (discussing
defendants' risk advantages and greater risk-bearing capabilities).
26. See Silver & Baker, supranote 21, at 748.
27. See Molot, supra note 25, at 83-89.
28. Indeed, even if it comes with a sort of rough-justice "damages averaging," risk-averse
plaintiffs with large claims might welcome an increased chance of lower recovery in an aggregate
settlement. But see Moore, Case Against, supra note 9, at 168-69 (arguing that damages
averaging hurts claimants with high-value claims). For a discussion of damages averaging in
aggregate settlements, see Katherine Dirks, Note, Ethical Rules of Conduct in the Settlement of
Mass Torts: A Proposalto Revise Rule 1.8(g), 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 501, 517-20 (2008). Additionally,
aggregation can help conserve the defendant's assets and preserve its value as a going concern in
cases where those assets might not be sufficient to cover all of the plaintiffs' claims. Silver &
Baker, supra note 21, at 749.
29. See, e.g., Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 9, at 548-49; Silver & Baker,
supra note 21, at 745-48.
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the group.30 Defendants understandably do not want to pay top dollar
to settle a collection of weak claims only to be left facing the strongest
claims in continued litigation. Because they must hold back money to
litigate against the opt-outs, where such adverse selection is possible,
defendants will necessarily pay less per plaintiff to settle the
incomplete aggregation.
Second, a global settlement generates efficiencies and saves on
transaction costs for defendants as well as plaintiffs. Handling claims
in bulk is more cost effective for defendants. Accordingly, the cost of
litigating against a few opt-outs may be disproportionately high-the
flip side of the economies of scale in aggregation. There are simply
fewer cases across which to spread the costs of developing common
factual or legal issues that will arise at trial. Further, if defendants
can offer a lump sum and disclaim any role in the allocation, they can
avoid the cost of valuing and negotiating individual claims. 31 And
broad settlements give defendants better returns on the sunk costs
they have already spent on valuation and negotiation. 32 The marginal
cost of adding another claim to a group settlement is typically less
than the cost of negotiating a separate settlement. For similar
reasons, defendants will often pay to settle even weak claims as part
of a global deal to avoid the nuisance of protracted litigation.33
Third, defendants may be willing to pay extra for finality
because it reduces the chances that future losses at trial or serial
settlements will encourage the filing of new claims. In the fen-phen
diet-drug litigation, for example, the well-publicized announcement of
a generous but incomplete settlement led to a massive influx of new
claims. 34 Many of these claims were based on dubious medical
diagnoses and exacerbated the adverse selection problem, as
claimants with stronger claims opted out of the depleted settlement
fund. 35

30. See Silver & Baker, supra note 21, at 760-63. This is exactly what happened in the fenphen settlement, where ninety thousand of the strongest claims opted out. See John C. Coffee,
Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 318 (2010);
see also Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 275-76 (noting failure of incomplete aggregate
settlements to achieve closure in OxyContin, Zyprexa, and Ortho Evra litigations).
31. See Howard Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58 KAN. L. REV.
979, 1010 (2010) [hereinafter Erichson, All-or-Nothing].
32. See Silver & Baker, supra note 21, at 761-62, 766.
33. See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 311 (3d Cir. 2011) ("Settlements avoid
future litigation with all potential plaintiffs-meritorious or not."); id. at 339 (Scirica, J.,
concurring) (noting that defendants may have incentives to settle even weak claims in a class).
34. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SEITLEMENT 143-51 (2007).
35. See id. at 145-48.
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Finally, closure eliminates contingent liabilities for defendants,
allowing them to focus on their businesses going forward, reduce
uncertainty, and release reserves. By contrast, continued litigation
against even a handful of plaintiffs may result in additional negative
publicity, attract unwanted regulatory scrutiny, and hamper access to
capital markets-hard-to-quantify costs that may be greatly
disproportionate to the number or value of remaining claims.36
In short, because a defendant may face disproportionate risks
or costs from continued litigation with a handful of nonsettling
plaintiffs, a group of plaintiffs can charge a premium if they can
package all of their claims together and settle them as a single unit.
The Third Circuit recognized as much in Sullivan v. DB Investments,
Inc., where Judge Scirica explained that a defendant "may be
motivated to pay class members a premium and achieve a global
settlement in order to avoid additional lawsuits . . . ."37
The size of this peace premium in any given case is an
empirical question, worthy of study in its own right, but its existence
is clear, as defendants often insist on participation by all or nearly all
of the plaintiffs as a condition of settlement. 38 "Walk-away" provisions
that allow defendants to back out if too few plaintiffs sign on are a
regular feature of aggregate settlements. 39 And, in some cases, such as

36. As Judge Scirica noted in Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc.:
[A] defendant may desire global settlement for several possible reasons: (1) redressing
plaintiffs' injuries; (2) the possibility of liability; (3) the direct costs of defending suits,
often in multiple fora; (4) the risk of financially unmanageable jury verdicts which
may threaten bankruptcy; (5) the effects of pending or impending mass litigationon its
stock price or access to capital markets; (6) the stigma of brand-damaginglitigation;
and (7) maintainingfinancialstability.
667 F.3d at 339 n.9 (Scirica, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 339; see also id. at 311 (majority) ("From a practical standpoint ... achieving
global peace is a valid, and valuable, incentive to class action settlements."); id. at 313 n.44
("[T]he settlement amount to which DeBeers has agreed must be based in large part on the
number of potential class members and on securing global peace.").
38. See, e.g., Erichson, All-or-Nothing, supra note 31, at 979. I am not aware of any
empirical studies of the size of the peace premium, but one study of securities class action
settlements provides potential support for its existence. James Cox and Randall Thomas found
that the ratio of settlement amounts to estimated provable losses has declined since the passage
of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"). James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas,
Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Action,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1627 (2006). In the same time frame, institutional investors have been
opting out with increasing frequency. See Coffee, supra note 30, at 311-14. Correlation is not
causation of course, but the declining settlement amounts per claimant may represent the loss of
the peace premium as defendants pay less to settle class claims when they must face significant
numbers of opt-outs. Further study is needed to confirm any causal effect.
39. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at *10-11 & n.42), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=2137782.
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the World Trade Center Disaster Site settlement discussed at the
outset of this Article, defendants are even willing to make sizable
"bonus payments" for 100% participation. 40
Figure 1: Slope Good
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In property-theory terms, settlement of mass litigation is often
a "step" or "lumpy" good, as opposed to a "slope" good. 41 In other
words, the surplus generated by an aggregate settlement does not
increase along a steady slope as more claims are included (Fig. 1).
Instead, the value generated by a settlement may jump considerably
once a certain threshold of aggregation is reached.
Settlements for some forms of relief, like injunctions, can be
step goods (Fig. 2). There is very little value for the defendant in an
incomplete settlement because any plaintiff suing alone could obtain
the same injunctive relief as the group.42 But once the last plaintiff is
persuaded to sign on, the value of settlement may be considerable.
40. See In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 189-90 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); World Trade Settlement, supra note 1, §§ II.A, IV, VI.E; see also infra note 55.
41. See Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 907, 957-61, 97178 (2004) [hereinafter Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies] ("A step good ... delivers no benefits
at all until a certain contribution threshold is reached; it then delivers all of the benefits in a
single lump upon reaching that threshold, and delivers no additional benefits beyond that
point."); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property 1 (Univ. of Chi. Inst. for Law & Economics
Olin Research Paper No. 585, 2012) (stating that a "bridge that only spans three-quarters of the
distance across a chasm" is a "standard ... lumpy, indivisible, or step good . .").
42. See Silver & Baker, supra note 21, at 762 (observing that where any plaintiff alone may
obtain an injunction, "[flreedom from the threat of an injunction [is] therefore a lumpy or step
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Figure2: Step Good
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For other types of claims, aggregate settlements may be lumpy
goods, where the surplus generated by additional plaintiffs signing on
does not steadily increase in a linear fashion, but does not come all in
one step either when complete aggregation is reached, as with an
injunction (Fig. 3). In other words, it is not necessary for all the claims
to be assembled for there to be any surplus, but the value of settling
each additional claim approaching a certain threshold may be
disproportionately high. 43 Thus, the defendant may be willing to pay
something to settle an incomplete aggregation but would be willing to
pay a considerable peace premium for a settlement that includes the
claims at the threshold.44 Note that this threshold need not
good that only the entire plaintiff group could deliver"); cf. Knisley v. City of Jacksonville, 497
N.E.2d 883, 884-87 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (involving attempted aggregate settlement of claims
seeking injunction against construction of certain buildings). This assumes that the plaintiffs'
chances of obtaining an injunction are highly correlated-a realistic assumption when similarly
situated plaintiffs seek injunctive relief against a common defendant. If their chances were
independent, then the defendant might pay to settle some of the claims to reduce the number of
opportunities for plaintiffs to "roll the dice," though the value of settlement to the defendant
would still increase exponentially with the number of claims. The chances of error will always be
independent to some degree, so an injunction may not be a true step good, but without the
uncertainty of a jury trial, the chances of error may not be a significant factor in the defendant's
settlement calculus. I thank Andrew Hayashi for pressing me on this point.
43.

Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, supra note 41, at 971-73.

44. The World Trade Center Disaster Site settlement provides a stark illustration of the
premium a defendant will pay to get the last few claimants to sign on. See supra notes 1-2, 40
and accompanying text. For another example of the peace premium in action, compare the Gulf
Coast Claims Facility ("GCCF') that BP set up to resolve claims stemming from the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill with the recent class action settlement that superseded it. Compare BDO
CONSULTING, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE GULF COAST CLAIMs FACILITY REPORT OF
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necessarily be 100% participation. It is possible that once a certain
threshold has been reached, the handful of claims left over may not, as
a practical matter, be viable to litigate individually and thus not
worth any additional premium to include in the settlement. 45 But
defendants might still prefer total peace since they are at an
informational disadvantage and cannot be sure that all viable claims
are included.
Figure 3: Lumpy Good
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2. Control Rights Are Dispersed
Although their claims can be worth more in the aggregate, the
rights to control those claims are dispersed among the individual
plaintiffs. Each plaintiff has a property right-a chose in action-tb
control his or her own claim and to determine how it will be pursued
& OBSERVATIONS
(2012),
available at www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
66520126611210351178.pdf, with Deepwater Horizon Econ. & Prop. Damages Settlement
Agreement as Amended on May 2, 2012, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the
Gulf of Mex., on April 20, 2010, (MDL No. 2179) (E.D. La. May 2, 2012) [hereinafter Deepwater
Horizon
Settlement],
available
at
http://www.deepwaterhorizonsettlements.com
/Documents/Economic%20SA/Settlement_ Agreement.pdf. The class settlement, which could offer
BP a greater degree of finality, resulted in higher payments per claimant than the GCCF, which
could not offer closure. For a more detailed comparison, see Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore
Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (on file with author).
45. This is most likely when the claims are relatively small or uniform, such as consumer
claims, and less likely when the claims are large and subject to adverse selection, such as mass
torts.
FINDINGS
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and on what terms it will be settled. 46 Plaintiffs thus face a collective
action problem. If they can cooperate they can capture the peace
premium. But if any individual refuses to participate in a
comprehensive settlement, the plaintiffs cannot maximize the value of
their claims. In such a dynamic, holdout problems are likely to
accompany the standard transaction costs of locating and negotiating
among a dispersed group of rights holders (which can, themselves, be
considerable).
Holdouts might occur for either genuine or strategic reasons.
The natural variation in risk preferences across the group of plaintiffs
may lead risk seekers to reject a deal that risk-averse plaintiffs would
accept. 47 Likewise, plaintiffs with idiosyncratic (or even irrational)
valuations of their claims or those litigating for noneconomic reasons
might reject a settlement offer that the rest of the plaintiffs would
accept. But some plaintiffs may act strategically and threaten to
wreck an all-or-nothing deal by withholding their consent to settle
unless they are given a disproportionately greater share of the
allocation. 48 The problem is that it can be very difficult to tell the
difference between plaintiffs who withhold their consent for genuine
or strategic reasons. 49 And the mere anticipation of strategic behavior,
even in the absence of actual holdouts, may be enough to prevent
value-generating aggregation from occurring, regardless of the
plaintiffs' true motivations.50

46. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) ("[A] chose in action is a
constitutionally recognized property interest possessed by each of the plaintiffs."). The nature of
this property right is somewhat peculiar. Each claim is an entitlement to seek payment from the
defendant under a liability rule where the court (or jury) sets the price. But, given the costs and
uncertainty of litigating a claim to judgment, settlement will often be a higher-value use of the
entitlement than trial. The important point is that, in the settlement context, the entitlement
functions under a property rule where each plaintiff retains dictatorial control over whether and
under what circumstances to surrender the claim. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089, 1092 (1972).
47. See, e.g., Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 9, at 573. Some scholars refer to
individuals who refuse to participate for genuine reasons as "hold-ins." E.g., Gideon
Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and
Economics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 128-29 (2004).
48. See Silver & Baker, supra note 21, at 767-68.
49. See Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, supra note 41, at 983.
50. See id. at 928 (noting that anticipation of strategic behavior may "discourag[e] a wouldbe assembler from bothering to incur the cost of attempting an assembly"); see also AM. LAW
INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17 cmt. b (2010) ("Even the threat
of such a holdout may cause the defendant to withhold the premium associated with complete
peace, thereby inuring to the detriment of all the represented claimants.").
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It is important to recognize that, contrary to the assumptions of
some commentators, 5 1 the risk of strategic holdouts does not depend
on an all-or-nothing settlement offer. While the holdout problem is
most acute in attempts to craft a truly comprehensive peace, strategic
holdouts are possible even where the defendant does not demand
unanimous participation. If the settlement terms allow the defendant
to walk away if a certain threshold number of plaintiffs refuse to
participate (for example, the settlement might require 95%
participation), then any feasible subgroup larger than that threshold
can hold out.5 2 A subgroup of plaintiffs would, of course, need to
overcome their own collective action problem to credibly threaten to
hold out, but preexisting relationships might facilitate cooperation and
allow them to threaten to vote as a bloc. Such cohesive voting blocs are
frequently present in aggregate litigation when a subset of plaintiffs
are referred to the larger group by the same referring lawyer-who
will have a natural incentive to coordinate the holdout bloc to
maximize his contingent referral fee.
Indeed, in the recent BP oil-spill settlement, the parties
recognized the potential for a subgroup of plaintiffs to hold out and
crafted a creative walk-away provision to address the problem. The
threshold number of opt-outs that the defendant and Plaintiffs
Steering Committee agreed would allow the defendant to walk away
was filed with the court in a sealed envelope.53 Keeping the threshold
confidential makes it more difficult for any strategic player attempting
to coordinate a holdout bloc to know whether he has enough support to
make a credible threat. But this feature of the BP settlement
prompted objections in the district court and could arguably run afoul
of a strict reading of the plaintiffs' lawyers' ethical obligations to
disclose settlement terms to all clients. 54

51. E.g., Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 9, at 574 (stating that holdouts
"should not present a significant problem unless defendants insist on all-or-nothing package
settlement deals"); Erichson, All-or-Nothing, supra note 31, at 1013 ("[T]he holdout problem
should be understood . . . as a problem with deals that are structured to require full
participation."); Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 317-19 (discussing the power enjoyed by
individual plaintiffs in all-or-nothing settlements); Moore, Group Decisionmaking,supra note 9,
at 403 (recognizing that "[s]trategic holdouts might be a problem if unanimity is required before
a settlement can become effective as to any of the clients" but arguing that defendants do not
often structure settlements to require 100% participation).
52.
See Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies,supra note 41, at 963.
53. DeepwaterHorizon Settlement, supra note 44, at § 21.3.6.
54.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2012); Halliburton Energy Servs.,
Inc.'s Preliminary Objections at 6, In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf
of Mex., on April 20, 2010, (MDL No. 2179) (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 2012).
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Value also may be lost when the potential for holdouts makes
complete aggregation impossible. A defendant might be willing to
settle with a 95% participation threshold (if it creates some surplus
over serial individual settlements or trials) and pay some premium for
near-complete peace, but the defendant might have paid
disproportionately more for complete participation. In the World
Trade Center Disaster Site settlement, for example, the defendant
was willing to pay more than twice as much per claimant to get the
last 5% to sign on.55 But because the plaintiffs could get only 95.1% to
participate by the deadline, they left up to $87.5 million on the table.56
Without the assurance of finality, defendants must inevitably hold
back money both to cover the costs of litigating or settling the highervalue claims that (through adverse selection) are most likely to opt out
and to pay off strategic players who threaten to derail a beneficial
settlement in order to extort a larger payment. The mere potential for
holdouts therefore prevents plaintiffs from maximizing the value of
their claims by capturing the full peace premium.
Aggregate litigation thus presents a familiar anticommons
problem: the plaintiffs' rights are worth more if they can be assembled
into a single unit for sale to the defendant, but because ownership of
those rights is dispersed, transaction costs and holdout problems can
prevent successful value-generating aggregation.

55. The World Trade Settlement Disaster Site settlement had a graduated bonus payment
structure. If 95% of plaintiffs participated, the defendant would pay them a lump sum of $625
million. If fewer participated, the defendant could walk away. For each additional percentage
point over the 95% threshold, the defendant would increase that lump sum by 2% of the initial
settlement amount (i.e., an additional $12.5 million), up to 98% participation. For each
additional 0.1% over 98% participation, the defendant would pay an additional 0.2% (i.e., $1.25
million). Thus 100% participation would bring the total to be shared among the plaintiffs to
$687.5 million. The defendant also agreed to make "contingent payments" of up to $25 million in
the years following the settlement if the cost of litigating against opt-outs and future claims did
not exceed certain thresholds, bringing the plaintiffs' potential total recovery for 100%
participation to $712.5 million. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184,
189-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); World Trade Settlement, supra note 1, §§ IIA, IV, VI.E.
56. See Navarro, supra note 2. The district court subsequently dismissed several hundred
unresponsive plaintiffs' claims, reducing the denominator and bringing the participation rate up
to 99.4%. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d at 193. Defendants'
challenge to basing bonus payments on the higher participation rate is pending in the Second
Circuit. Cirino v. City of New York, No. 11-4021-cv(L) (2d Cir. filed Oct. 5, 2011). Even with the
99.4% participation rate, the plaintiffs left $7.5 million in bonus payments on the table, and the
defendants held back an additional $25 million in "contingent payments" to cover the cost of
litigating or settling with the opt-outs. World Trade Settlement, supra note 1, §§ IV, VI.E.
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C. Market Solutions and Persistent TransactionCosts
Sometimes market forces will solve anticommons problems. In
the absence of transaction costs (or if they are sufficiently low)
dispersed rights holders will sell their rights to the collective if it will
generate a surplus.57 Even in the face of transaction costs, the market
often develops private structural arrangements to reduce the costs of
bundling rights when the background rules threaten to waste
resources.58 For example, in intellectual property, copyright collectives
and patent pools have emerged as market solutions to potential
anticommons problems.59 Likewise, in sovereign debt restructuring,
sovereign bond contracts have incorporated collective action clauses to
limit the power of holdouts.60
In fact, the market goes a long way toward effecting
aggregation in mass litigation. Attorney advertising and referral
networks concentrate similar claims in the hands of a few plaintiffs'
attorneys. 61 And these attorneys cooperate to coordinate claims
through formal and informal mechanisms, such as loose coalitions of
firms or court-appointed steering committees in cases consolidated in
a multidistrict litigation ("MDL").62 Indeed, some scholars have
concluded that aggregate settlements are "inevitable."63
But persistent transaction costs prevent plaintiffs from
capturing all of the benefits of complete aggregation-like the peace

57. See Coase, supra note 19, at 1-15.
58. See, e.g., Heller, supranote 4, at 674 ("Despite the presence of transaction costs, people
will be able in many cases to negotiate with each other to overcome an anticommons and put the
property to more efficient use .... ); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 700 (citing the music
industry as one group of property owners who have "developed institutions to reduce transaction
costs of bundling multiple licenses").
59. Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There a Biomedical Anticommons?,
REGULATION, Summer 2004, at 54, 56 (describing how patent pooling overcomes the
anticommons); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 700 (noting the emergence of such patent
pools in "communities of intellectual property owners"); see also infra Part III.B.1.

60.

See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Draftinga Model Collective Action Clause for

Eurozone Sovereign Bonds, 6 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 317 (2011) [hereinafter Buchheit & Gulati,

Model CAC); see also infra Part III.B.2.
61.

See Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 9, at 532-39; Howard M. Erichson,

Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of CoordinationAmong Counsel in
Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 386-401 (2000); Charles Silver, Ethics and Innovation, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754, 765-67 (2011).
62. See Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 9, at 539-43; cf. ELINOR OSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 88-102
(1990) (positing that common pool resource problems are best managed by populations exhibiting
strong institutions and norms of cooperative behavior).
63. Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlements: An
InstitutionalAccount of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1569, 1634 (2004).
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premium. Where claims are small, as with negative-value claims,
transaction costs are often insurmountable. The costs of coordination
are simply not worth the effort. Only a regulatory solution-the class
action-allows lawyers to assemble these claims into a collective
worth litigating. 64 But doctrinal and practical barriers prevent the use
of class actions for many types of larger claims, like mass torts, where
individual issues of causation and damages will often predominate
over common issues, and choice-of-law problems for state-law claims
may make nationwide classes unmanageable.65
Even where claims are large enough to justify the costs of
coordination without the class action mechanism, some state-law legal
ethics rules act as barriers to market-driven aggregation. For
example, restrictions on the sale of legal claims, like rules prohibiting
champerty and limiting fee sharing, prevent potentially efficient
bundling transactions.66 Plaintiffs cannot simply trade their rights on

64. As the' Court explained in Amchem Products,Inc. v. Windsor:
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem
that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo
action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating
the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an
attorney's) labor.
521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (internal citation omitted); see also Judith Resnik, Money Matters:
Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual
and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2145-46 (2000) ("The class action rule ...
[gives lawyers incentives] to subsidize access to courts for small claimants . . . ."); Rosenberg,
Only Option, supra note 23, at 861 ("Litigation class action is a form of regulation that overrides
the market in mass tort claims.").
65. See, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in
Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 761 (2012); Klonoff, supra note 5.
66. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a) (2012) ("A lawyer or law firm shall not
share fees with a nonlawyer . . . ."); 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty, Maintenance,and Barratry§§ 115 (2013) (explaining that rules against champerty prohibit nonparties from acquiring an
interest in the recovery from a lawsuit). Some scholars have suggested relaxing restrictions on
the sale of legal claims to allow third parties to buy claims or otherwise finance litigation, or to
allow lawyers themselves to buy claims outright. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 105-10 (1991) ("[T]he legal
system should experiment with an auction approach to large-scale, small-claim cases and
derivative suits."); Molot, supra note 25, at 72 (suggesting that making a settlement resemble a
market may help "to offset the imbalances in risk preferences that might otherwise threaten to
overpower the merits in settlements negotiations"); Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?
Third-PartyLitigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1270-73 (2011) (explaining the potential
of litigation funding). There are practical obstacles to such solutions, as any transfer would have
to ensure the plaintiffs' cooperation for the claims to retain value. See Molot, supra note 25, at
108 ("[A] plaintiffs lack of incentive to win the case might render the claim less valuable. . . .").
And holdout problems may persist, as "vulture funds" might try to buy up enough claims to
establish a blocking position and hold out for a greater share of any aggregate settlement-as
they have tried to do in sovereign debt restructuring. See Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal
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the open market or sell their claims to a collective.67 They can only sell
their claims to one party-the defendant.68 Likewise, the defendant
can buy peace only by purchasing all of the claims from the plaintiffs.
There are no substitute goods. The market for claims is thus
necessarily thin, and the plaintiffs and defendant are locked in a
bilateral monopoly. 69
Market-based attempts to overcome the anticommons have also
run afoul of the ethical rules governing aggregate settlements. In
cases where the peace premium is large enough, claimants may
rationally want to trade their autonomy to participate in a collective
that could credibly offer the defendant finality. Thus they may
attempt to craft private governance structures to reduce transaction
costs and prevent holdout problems. For example, each plaintiff might
agree in advance to be bound by a group decision on whether to accept
or reject a settlement offer, thereby guarding against strategic or
irrational behavior once money is on the table and empowering the
group to negotiate for a peace premium. Indeed, groups of plaintiffs
and their lawyers have attempted to craft such private governance
arrangements on several occasions. 70
But courts have uniformly interpreted the traditional
aggregate settlement rule, exemplified by ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.8(g), to prohibit plaintiffs from contractually
precommitting to group decisions on settlement.71 The aggregate
Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 299, 309-11 (2005) (noting that
such blocking by "vulture funds," while rare, has occurred in restructuring cases).
67. Many claims-including personal injury claims-are personal to the plaintiff and
cannot be validly assigned to a third party. See, e.g., 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments §§ 46, 48, 55
(2013). Even those that can be assigned must ultimately be sold to the defendant.
68. Plaintiffs can, and often do, sell portions of their claims to their lawyers as contingency
fees. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35(1) (2000). But they cannot
assign their entire claims to their lawyers. Id. § 36(1). And lawyers would be prohibited from
paying clients cash for those claims. MODEL RULES OF. PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e). Nor can clients
even assign control over settlement decisions to their lawyers. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 22 (2000). Thus, while partial sale of claims to lawyers inevitably
creates an agency problem, it does not solve the holdout problem-as other agency relationships
like corporations do by separating ownership and control-because the individual clients must
always retain control over the critical decision whether to settle. Cf. Macey & Miller, supra note
66 (proposing to eliminate agency costs by allowing class of plaintiffs to sell claims to attorneyentrepreneurs).
69. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 75-77
(1986) (discussing bilateral monopolies).
70. See, e.g., Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 513 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir. 1975); Tax Auth.,
Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 521, 523 (N.J. 2006).
71. E.g., Hayes, 513 F.2d at 894; Knisley v. City of Jacksonville, 497 N.E.2d 883, 887-88
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986); In re Hoffman, 883 So.2d 425 (La. 2004). See generally Erichson & Zipursky,
supra note 9, at 296-98 (discussing court treatment of aggregate settlements). Bar association
ethics opinions have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., ABA Comm. On Ethics & Profl
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settlement rule requires a lawyer attempting to settle claims on behalf
of multiple clients to obtain the individual consent of each client after
disclosing all of the settlement's terms-including every other client's
share. This empowers each client to refuse to participate at the back
end and potentially wreck a global deal.
For example, in Abbott v. Kidder Peabody & Co., a group of
more than two hundred investors suing the same defendant for fraud
tried to create a private governance structure to maximize their
leverage in settlement negotiations.72 Each client signed a
representation contract that created a steering committee elected by a
majority to manage the litigation and determine whether to settle.73
They agreed that settlement proceeds would be shared by the entire
group, according to a predetermined allocation formula. 74 And any
plaintiff who settled individually would have to place the funds in
escrow pending resolution of the group's claims, to be shared according
to the allocation formula with the group.75
The arrangement worked well, and even though the defendant
tried to pick off plaintiffs one by one and settle their claims in courtsupervised individual settlement conferences, the plaintiffs repeatedly
opted "to stay with the group."76 Frustrated that the plaintiffs kept
resisting its attempts to divide and conquer, the defendant asked the
court to declare the group governance provisions of the representation
contract unenforceable.
Siding with the defendant, the court was unreceptive to the
plaintiffs' attempt to structure their collective representation to defeat
the anticommons dynamic. The court found that even though the
plaintiffs had "freely and voluntarily" agreed to the representation
contract, which "represent[ed] the clients' preferences for the handling
of the case," the arrangement was unenforceable because it was
inconsistent with the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct.
Accordingly, the court disqualified the plaintiffs' lawyer from
representing the group.77

Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-438 (2006); Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Formal Op. 2009-6
(2009).
72.
42 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1048 (D. Colo. 1999); see also Silver, supra note 61, at 758-60
(discussing the Abbott case).
73. Abbott, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
74. Id. at 1048-49.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1049; cf. Yeon-Koo Che & Kathryn Spier, Exploiting Plaintiffs Through
Settlement: Divide and Conquer, 164 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 4 (2008).
77. Abbott, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1050-51.
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Similarly, in Tax Authority, Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., a
group of tax-preparation business owners crafted a private governance
structure in their breach-of-contract suits against a common
franchisor.78 All 154 plaintiffs signed identical retainer agreements
with the same lawyer to represent them collectively, creating a
steering committee and providing that all the plaintiffs would be
bound if a weighted majority approved a settlement.79 The retainer
agreements also specified a formula for allocating the settlement
proceeds as well as sharing responsibility for fees and costs. 8 0 The
steering committee negotiated a settlement with the defendant and a
weighted majority of the plaintiffs approved it, but one dissenter did
not want to be bound and challenged the arrangement.8 1
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the majority-rule
provisions of the retainer agreement violated the aggregate settlement
rule, which "forbids an attorney from obtaining consent in advance
from multiple clients that each will abide by a majority decision in
respect of an aggregate settlement." 82 The court explained: "Before a
client may be bound by a settlement, he or she must have knowledge
of the terms of the settlement and agree to them." 83 But the court
applied its ruling only prospectively, allowing the settlement to stand
and-perhaps signaling that the time had come to reconsider the
aggregate settlement rule in New Jersey-referred the issue to the
state bar Commission on Ethics Reform. 84 The Commission has not
modified the rule.
Recognizing that mechanical application of the aggregate
settlement rule can frustrate large-scale beneficial settlements, the
recent ALI Principles proposed a modification of the rule in mass
litigation. The ALI's proposal would allow joint clients to waive the
individual-consent requirement and instead agree in advance to be
bound by a supermajority vote on group settlements-to essentially do
what the plaintiffs in Tax Authority tried to do-subject to judicial
review for procedural and substantive fairness.85 But, to date, no state
or court has adopted the ALI's proposal. And at least one bar

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

898 A.2d 512, 515 (N.J. 2006). Their franchise agreements prohibited class actions. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 516-17.
Id. at 522.
Id.
Id. at 522-23.
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17(b) (2010).
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association ethics opinion has expressly rejected it, stressing the need
to protect client autonomy over settlement decisions.86
By frustrating market-driven attempts to reduce transaction
costs and prevent holdouts through private governance structures for
group decisionmaking, legal ethics rules aimed at preserving client
autonomy allow the anticommons problem in aggregate litigation to
persist. While these ethical rules may be good ways to protect clients
and ensure lawyer loyalty in the paradigm of one-on-one
representation, they function as state-imposed transaction costs on
value-generating aggregation and can prevent the very clients they
are trying to protect from maximizing the values of their claims.
D. Novel and ExtralegalAttempts to Capture the Peace Premium
Despite these formal legal obstacles, the market is straining for
a solution that would allow parties in mass litigation to capture the
peace premium. Anticommons problems can sometimes induce parties
to resort to extralegal means to get around formal legal rules that
impede otherwise-efficient transactions. For example, in postsocialist
Moscow, while excessive fragmentation of rights prevented retailers
from opening storefronts, entrepreneurs were able to operate street
kiosks through the comparatively simple process of bribing a handful
of municipal officials and making protection payments to easily
identifiable criminal organizations. 87 Similarly, predatory Moscow
real-estate bundlers attempting to convert komunalkas-socialist-era
group apartments jointly owned by dozens of tenants-into
marketable single-family units frequently used coercive tactics to
overcome the anticommons by intimidating or even murdering tenants
who attempted to hold out for a greater share of the bundling
surplus.88 Through extralegal means, parties can capture some of the
otherwise wasted surplus created by overcoming the anticommons,
but such attempts frequently involve illegal and unfairly coercive
behavior.89
Similarly, pressure to capture the peace premium in aggregate
litigation, along with parties' inability to use ex ante contractual
arrangements to modify the aggregate settlement rule, has led to both

86.
87.
88.
89.

Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Formal Op. 2009-6 (2009).
Heller, supra note 4, at 642-44.
Id. at 650-54.
Id. at 644-45 (citing HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER

PATH: THE INVISIBLE

REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD 151-82 (1989)); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING

WITH THE STATE 41-42 (1993) (arguing that coercion leads to deadweight social loss).
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innovative settlement structures that push the boundaries of legal
ethics and outright abusive practices.
1. The Vioxx Settlement Lawyer-Withdrawal Requirement
The settlement of the massive product-liability litigation over
the drug Vioxx provides an example of the creative lengths to which
parties will go to achieve complete peace. The defendant, Merck,
reached an agreement with the plaintiffs' lawyers to recommend
participation in a global settlement to all of their clients and to
withdraw from representing any client who rejected the settlement. 90
Thus clients who wished to reject the settlement would have to find
themselves another lawyer (and their current lawyers had little
incentive to help them because the settlement barred them from
receiving a referral fee for doing so or otherwise retaining any
financial interest in any case that remained in the litigation).9 ' The
Vioxx settlement was successful in achieving $4.85 billion in
compensation for the 99.79% of claimants who enrolled, but the
settlement has attracted much criticism for pushing the boundaries of
several ethics rules and failing to reflect the true consent of clients. 92
The lawyer-withdrawal features of the Vioxx settlement bear a
striking resemblance to a coercive technique sometimes used to
prevent holdouts in sovereign debt restructuring. When a country's
sovereign debt reaches an unsustainable level, it is often in the
interests of both the sovereign and its creditors to restructure that
debt with all of the creditors agreeing to take a haircut to avoid a

90. Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc., and the Counsel Listed on the
Signature Pages Hereto § 1.2.8 (Nov. 9, 2007), available at http://www.legalexaminer.com/
For
uploadedFiles/InjuryBoardcomContent/Overviews/VioxxMasterSettlementAgreement.pdf.
competing takes on the dynamics and features of the Vioxx settlement, see Erichson & Zipursky,
supra note 9, at 274-81, and Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claim, Aggregate Rights, 2008
SUPREME CT. REV. 183, 215-19.

91. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 266 ("A client wishing to decline the
settlement . . . faced the prospect of losing her lawyer and finding that every other lawyer
handling Vioxx claims was similarly unavailable."); Issacharoff, supra note 90, at 218 (describing
the prohibition on referral fees or ongoing interests for referring attorneys).
92. See, e.g., Conn. Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 08-01 (2008) (determining that a settlement
agreement like that in the Vioxx case interferes with a client's decision regarding settlement,
creates conflicts of interest, and deprives clients of independent advice from their lawyers);
Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 281-92 (describing various problems with the settlement
agreement from a legal ethics perspective); Erichson, All-or-Nothing, supra note 31, at 1000-04
(same); cf. Richard A. Nagareda, Closure in Damage Class Settlements: The Godfather Guide to
Opt-Out Rights, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141, 158-60, 167-69 (describing similar strategies to
destroy litigation value of opt-out claims).
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costly default and the prospect of not being paid at all. 93 In other
words, restructuring before default can generate value. But, because
the debt is held primarily by individual bondholders, an anticommons
dynamic exists: coordination in restructuring is difficult and holdouts
are likely. 94 Some hedge funds-known as "vulture funds"-even
specialize in buying up distressed sovereign bonds at a discount in
order to hold out for higher payments.95
Traditionally, for bonds issued under New York law (which
make up the majority of sovereign bonds), the unanimous consent of
all bondholders was needed to modify payment terms, making any
attempt to restructure by amending the bond contracts to reduce or
postpone payment particularly vulnerable to holdouts. 96 But countries
looking to restructure without paying off holdouts took advantage of
the fact that the bonds' nonpayment terms could be modified by a
simple majority vote. What they did was offer to exchange outstanding
bonds for a new issuance of bonds containing lower payment terms,
but only on the condition that participating bondholders consent to a
modification of the nonpayment terms of the old bonds. 97 These "exit
consents" were designed to make holding out unattractive by
destroying the value and liquidity of the old bonds by removing
bondholder protections such as cross default protections and publiclisting requirements. 98
While exit consents can help overcome the collective action
problem and make both debtors and creditors better off than if no
restructuring occurred, 99 they do so only by destroying the value of
bonds held by creditors who do not participate.100 And they make it
possible for the debtor and the majority of creditors to collude at the

93.

William W. Bratton & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of

Creditors,57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 18, 21-22 (2004); Hagan, supra note 66, at 307-08, 316.

94.
95.
96.
97.
UCLA L.
98.

See Hagan, supra note 66, at 309-11.
Id. at 322.
See id. at 317-18.
See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign Bond Exchanges, 48
REV. 59, 65-66 (2000) [hereinafter Buchheit & Gulati, Exit Consents].
Id. at 68-70.

99. Ran Bi, Marcos Chamon & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, The Problem that Wasn't:
CoordinationFailures in Sovereign Debt Restructurings 15-17 (IMF Working Paper No. 11/265,
2011), available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wpl1265.pdf.

100. See id. at 8; Buchheit & Gulati, Exit Consents, supra note 97, at 66, 68-69; see also
Christian Engelen & Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Hares and Stags in Argentinean Debt
Restructuring, 78 J. INT'L ECON. 141, 146 (2009) (explaining how exit consents favor the debtor
by imposing costs on bondholders outside restructuring).
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expense of the minority. 101 These features tend to shift bargaining
power from the creditors to the debtor.10 2 It is easy to see why this is
the case. By destroying the value of bonds outside of the restructuring,
exit consents make it difficult for bondholders to vote against an
inadequate deal. If they vote with their feet and refuse to participate,
they get none of the benefits of the restructuring and are left with an
illiquid and devalued bond; there is no process through which they can
voice their objections and still participate in the restructuring if they
are outvoted. In short, the aggregation made possible by coercive exit
consents can still generate value, but the debtor captures more of the
surplus.
Like exit consents, the lawyer-withdrawal terms of the Vioxx
settlement were designed to effectively impair the litigation value of
any would-be holdout's claims. And the terms were, in fact, quite
successful in doing so. With the litigation value of their claims
impaired, claimants who opposed the settlement would find it very
difficult to express their opposition. There was no voting process
through which claimants could "voice" their opposition, and the "exit"
option was rendered unattractive by the need to find a new lawyer.103
While such a coercive tactic likely helped the parties realize a peace
premium in overcoming the anticommons, it risked collusion between
the defendant and majority at the expense of the minority and likely
allowed the defendant to capture a relatively greater share of the
surplus generated by the comprehensive settlement. 104

101. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 93, at 23 (acknowledging the possibility that exiting
bondholders could approve an amendment lifting the contractual protections of holdouts,
benefitting themselves and the debtor at the holdouts' expense).
102. Bi, Chamon & Zettelmeyer, supra note 99, at 15; Engelen & Lambsdorff, supra note
100, at 146.
103. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
104. The Sulzer Hip Implant class settlement also illustrates the risk that coercive tactics
can shift bargaining leverage in favor of the defendant. The original settlement agreement
sought to deter opt-outs by creating a trust fund for the settling class secured by a lien on all of
the defendant's assets. In re Inter-Op Hip Prosthesis Liab. Litig., 204 F.R.D. 330, 353-54 (N.D.
Ohio 2001). The lien would have delayed payment of any settlement or judgment to opt-outs
until after all class members were paid-a process expected to take six years with no guarantee
that anything would be left. Id. at 354; see also Nagareda, supra note 92, at 157-59. But once
these features aimed at impairing the value of opt-out claims were removed (after the Sixth
Circuit expressed "serious doubts as to [their] legitimacy," Drummer v. Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc.,
No. 01-4039, 2001 WL 1774017, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 2001)), the final class settlement resulted
in higher and more liquid payouts to the settling plaintiffs. See Nagareda, supranote 92, at 16063.
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2. Illegal and Unethical Practices by Lawyers
In other instances, pressure for finality has led to outright
abuse by plaintiffs' lawyers, who stand to gain the most from the
ability to offer complete peace to the defendant.105 (In mass litigation,
the lawyer's contingent-fee share of the total recovery typically dwarfs
the share of any individual client, thus the lawyer has a greater
incentive than any individual to capture the peace premium for the
group.) Without the ability to agree with clients in advance on
structures of representation that would allow them to credibly offer
finality, lawyers have engaged in abusive practices, such as
maintaining slush funds to pay off holdouts, lying to clients about
settlement terms, and unduly pressuring clients to settle.106
Examples of abusive practices can be found in several
aggregate settlements despite the dictates of the aggregate settlement
rule. In the Philips Petroleum explosion settlement the plaintiffs'
lawyers falsely told them their settlement amounts had been
individually negotiated with the defendant based on a review of their
medical records in an attempt to make sure that all of the plaintiffs
accepted the defendant's lump-sum offer. 107 And some of the clients
who objected were offered larger sums (taken from the allocation set
aside for other clients) while other objectors were told that the lawyers
would not pursue their cases outside of the settlement and that, if
they hired other lawyers, they would have to pay contingency fees to
both firms.108
Similarly, Professor Howard Erichson has recently documented
lawyer abuses in a number of aggregate settlements where lawyers
used high-pressure tactics to ensure full participation in agreements
to settle their entire inventories of claims. 109 He describes lawyers
lying to their clients about how allocation determinations were made,
withholding portions of the settlement to create slush funds to pay off

105. See Silver, supra note 61, at 764-71 (describing various unethical actions taken by
plaintiffs' lawyers, particularly in the context of "all-or-nothing" settlement arrangements, and
the incentives for ensuring that defendants are not encouraged to "kill a deal").
106. See, e.g., Erichson, All-or-Nothing, supra note 31 (describing ethically dubious actions
taken by attorneys in a number of "all-or-nothing" settlement cases); Paul D. Rheingold, Ethical
Constraintson Aggregated Settlements of Mass Tort Cases, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 408 (1998)
(noting the "wide chasm which exists between professional ethics rules and actual practice").
107. Burrow v. Acre, 997 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. 1999); see also Lester Brickman, Anatomy of
an Aggregate Settlement: The Triumph of Temptation over Ethics, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 700,
711-12 (2011); Erichson, All-or-Nothing, supranote 31, at 1004-06.
108. Brickman, supra note 107, at 712.
109. Erichson, All-or-Nothing, supra note 31.
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objectors, and accepting side payments from the defendant in
exchange for getting every client to sign on.110
Erichson attributes these abuses to the all-or-nothing nature of
the settlements. He argues that such settlements should be eschewed
in favor of "most-or-nothing" settlements, where the risk of holdoutsand the pressure to get the last client to agree-will be lessened."'
But Erichson sidesteps the reason why parties tried so hard for
closure: defendants value closure and are willing to pay a premium for
it. Complete aggregation can generate a surplus over incomplete
aggregation. Plaintiffs in most-or-nothing settlements are thus
forfeiting the peace premium they could demand in exchange for
finality. Also, as noted above, Erichson underestimates the potential
for holdouts in settlements that do not require unanimous consent.112
When an anticommons dynamic causes parties to leave money
on the table, there will inevitably be pressure to circumvent whatever
formal legal obstacles stand in the way of capturing the surplus. And
arrangements by which lawyers use creative or extralegal means to
bundle claims for sale to the defendant frequently benefit the parties
at the negotiating table-lawyers and defendants-at the expense of
plaintiffs.
II. STRATEGIES FOR DEFEATING THE ANTICOMMONS AND THE
PROBLEMS THEY CREATE

Recognizing the anticommons in mass litigation reveals that
complete (or near complete) aggregation can generate value and that
transaction costs can prevent such value-generating aggregation from
110. Id. at 989-1000; see also Johnson v. Nextel Commc'ns, Inc., No. 06-CV-5547 (DM0),
2007 WL 2814649, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 2007) (describing side payments to plaintiffs' attorneys
by defendant); Buckwalter v. Napoli, Kaiser & Bern, LLP, No. 01 Civ. 10868LTSHBP, 2005 WL
736216, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2005) (describing misleading statements made by lawyers to
plaintiffs in fen-phen litigation); Morris v. Greitzer & Locks of N.J., L.L.C., No. A-4672-OGT3,
2009 WL 2525452, at *2-6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 20, 2009) (describing a dispute among
attorneys about referral fees based on a misstatement of a settlement amount).
111. Erichson, All-or-Nothing, supra note 31, at 1022-25. The pressure for abuse, however,
is still present in most-or-nothing settlements, as the Sixth Circuit's recent affirmance of twentyand twenty-five-year sentences for two lawyers in United States v. Cunningham, 679 F.3d 355
(6th Cir. 2012), demonstrates. There, the lawyers negotiated a $200 million lump-sum
settlement contingent upon 95% of their 440 clients signing on. Id. at 364. But through a
combination of lies, slush funds, and pressure, the lawyers convinced their clients to accept
distributions of only about a third of that amount, and the lawyers pocketed the rest. Id. at 36566.
112. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text. But see Erichson, All-or-Nothing, supra
note 31, at 1013 ("[The holdout problem should be understood not as a problem with the
aggregate settlement rule's requirement of informed consent, but rather as a problem with deals
that are structured to require full participation.").

2013]

ANTICOMMONS IN AGGREGATE LITIGATION

1213

occurring. Some transaction costs are inevitable when rights are
dispersed. But other transaction costs, like the aggregate settlement
rule, are artificially imposed by law. Paradoxically, rules intended to
protect plaintiffs in litigation can prevent them from maximizing the
value of their claims. By barring plaintiffs from transferring their
exclusion rights (i.e., the individual right to reject a settlement) to the
group in an enforceable manner, the aggregate settlement rule
prevents some transactions that could leave everybody better off.
Ordinarily, the law should facilitate, not block, transactions
that will result in joint gains. But maximizing aggregate value is not
the only consideration that should come into play. It is merely the first
stage in what is essentially a two-stage problem presented by the
anticommons. The second stage is determining how to allocate the
bundling surplus.
A. The Two-Stage Dynamic and the Need for Coercion
In the aggregate litigation context, the anticommons dynamic
presents a two-stage problem for plaintiffs: Stage one is the
negotiation phase (which includes litigation efforts necessary to
maximize negotiating position) where, because claims are worth more
in the aggregate, there are gains to be had from cooperation. Stage
two is the allocation phase, where the plaintiffs must divide up a
limited fund in a zero-sum game.
Absent transaction costs, when parties can create value by
trading their rights at stage one they will do so and then determine for
themselves how to share the resulting surplus at stage two. But in an
anticommons dynamic, where transaction costs and strategic behavior
make bargained-for aggregation impracticable, coercion of some form
is typically required to realize the joint gains at stage one." 3 That
coercion might come in the form of state regulatory power used to
force transfers of rights to a collective, like the use of eminent domain
to transfer tracts of land to a developer,114 or the certification of a
class, giving class counsel control over the claims of absent class
members. It might stem from enforcement of contractual
precommitments to be bound by a future group decision, as the
plaintiffs in Abbot and Tax Authority attempted. Or it might come in
the form of intimidation, as in the case of the Moscow real-estate
113. Small groups of rights holders with preexisting relationships may be able to overcome
anticommons problems without coercion, particularly if they are repeat players, but large,
dispersed groups of unconnected individuals have a much harder time coordinating activity
without some form of coercion. See generally OSTROM, supra note 62.
114. E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 472 (2005).
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bundlers attempting to convert komunalkas into single-family
residences,115 or lawyers lying to and pressuring their clients to accept
an all-or-nothing settlement.
As these examples illustrate, strategies for overcoming the
anticommons can take three general forms. The first is a regulatory
solution where the state forces aggregation by simply taking the
individual property rights or empowering an agent to do so. The
second is an ex ante contractual solution where the rights holders
precommit to be bound by group decisions made under a
nonunanimous-voting rule or empower an agent to make binding
decisions for the group. And the third is for a bundler to use force or
intimidation to override the consent of the rights holders and take all
of the rights for himself.
While these strategies can help solve the holdout problem
typical of the anticommons, their use of coercion gives rise to new
problems. Any strategy that allows joint decisions to be made without
unanimous consent creates a risk that the majority will exploit the
minority by directing benefits to themselves and costs to the
minority. 116 And any strategy that empowers an agent to coordinate
group activity creates a principal-agent problem, in which the agent
might shirk in his efforts to advance the group's interests or, worse,
direct benefits to himself at the group's expense.' 17
In an anticommons dynamic, therefore, aggregation has the
potential to make everyone better off, but once coercion is involved
there is no guarantee that it will. When the individual consent of all
rights holders must be obtained, each individual has the power to
block a transaction that will make him or her worse off.118 Only
transactions that make some parties better off without making any
party worse off (Pareto improvements) can go forward. The power to
hold out is also the power to avoid exploitation.
But when that consent can be overridden, there is no longer
any guarantee that no party will be made worse off. Those with
coercive power can take all of the bundling surplus-and more-for
115. Heller, supra note 4, at 653-54.
116. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 89, at 70 (noting that externalities created when the majority
can take advantage of a minority can lead to distributional inequities and overall efficiency loss);

Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald
Coase, 36 J.L. & EcON. 553, 559 (1993) (noting that parties are sometimes empowered to protect
their own interests through the mechanism of unanimous consent to prevent other parties from
exploiting a position of dominance).
117. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial

Behavior,Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976).
118. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 46, at 1107-08 (applying this principle in the
context of eminent domain and property taxes).
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themselves. The majority can exploit the minority, and agents can
exploit their principals, leaving some or all of the original rights
holders worse off. In other words, the coercion needed to solve the
holdout problem creates a tyranny-of-the-majority problem and an
agency problem. This coercion is typically necessary for plaintiffs to
maximize the value of their claims at stage one, but it leaves them
vulnerable to exploitation; the challenge comes in figuring out how to
fairly allocate the resulting surplus at stage two.
B. Evaluatingthe Use of Coercion To Defeat an Anticommons
When an anticommons dynamic blocks aggregation of rights
through voluntary transactions, the normative criteria for evaluating
the use of coercion to achieve aggregation track the two stages of the
anticommons problem: First, will the aggregation result in collective
gain, that is, does it create value? And second, will the parties to the
aggregation jointly realize the resulting surplus? These criteria stem
from what rational players in an anticommons dynamic would wantthat is, the opportunity to increase the size of the pie, but only with
the assurance that they will share in the collective gain and not be
exploited once they surrender their autonomy. The normative baseline
is thus whether the coerced aggregation will leave all parties at least
as well off as if no aggregation had occurred. 119
But requiring the aggregation to benefit (or at least not hurt)
every party is a demanding threshold when transaction costs and
holdout problems prevent the parties from voluntarily trading their
rights, particularly if measured ex post. Because the parties may not
reveal their subjective valuations of their rights, it may be difficult to
determine whether any involuntary aggregation in fact left every
party at least as well off. Indeterminacy, however, is not a good reason
for the law to abandon efforts to allow value-generating aggregation to
occur-particularly when the prospect of wasted resources may cause
parties to resort to extralegal means of coercion to capture them. 120
Indeed, recognizing the transaction costs, uncertainty, and
potential for holdouts, parties might be quite willing to trade their
autonomy for a chance at overcoming the anticommons, even if there
is no guarantee that they will be made better off in the end. This is
essentially what happens in contractual strategies for defeating the

119. The baseline is thus Pareto superiority. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and
Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 515-17 (1980) (describing the Pareto-superior
standard).
120. See supra Part I.D (describing examples of such methods).
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anticommons. From an ex ante perspective, each party is made better
off by precommitting to be bound by a group decision (assuming, of
course, that the other parties also commit to be bound), given the
expected surplus from aggregation and each party's expected share in
the allocation. Thus, aggregation may be an improvement for every
party at the relevant time, even if the ex post allocations do not work
out to the benefit of each party.121
C. Governance and the Legitimacy of Aggregation
In a world with transaction costs and incomplete information,
we might accept something less demanding than an ex post
improvement for every party so long as the procedures for allocating
the collective gain from coercive aggregation were fair. Thus, the
second normative criterion becomes one of governance instead of ex
post outcome: Are there adequate procedures in place to fairly allocate
the bundling surplus? These procedures must be able to deal with the
problems created by the use of coercion at the first stage to override
individual consent in favor of a group decision; that is, they should be
designed to combat opportunistic behavior by either the majority at
the expense of individuals or the agent at the expense of the
principals.122 In short, the legitimacy of using coercion to compel
participation in a value-generating bundling transaction at the first
stage depends on the presence of some form of governance mechanism

121. This insight escaped the Second Circuit in follow-on litigation to the Agent Orange
class settlement, which set up a $180 million fund for claimants who developed an AgentOrange-related disease within ten years-an attractive offer, when viewed ex ante, for exposureonly claimants who did not know if or when they might get sick. But in Stephenson v. Dow
Chemical Co., 273 F.3d 249, 261 (2d Cir. 2001), the court adopted an ex post perspective and held
that two disappointed plaintiffs who manifested injuries after the ten-year period were not bound
because the interests of such postfund future claimants were not adequately represented at the
time of the settlement. Viewed in light of the anticommons, however, Stephenson should be read
narrowly for the proposition that the governance structures to protect future claimants were
inadequate (because the district court had declined to appoint a future-claims representative),
not that future interests can never be protected in a time-limited manner or that class
settlements are always open to collateral attack by future claimants. Contrast Stephenson with
Uhl v. Thoroughbred Technology & Telecommunications, Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 980-81 (7th Cir.
2002), which evaluated a class settlement from an ex ante perspective. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note
89, at 97-98 (arguing that when parties' initial expectations are in rough parity, the right
incentives exist to maximize collective gain, even if an ex post division of surplus does not work
out precisely pro rata).
122. It may be necessary to pay the bundler a share of the surplus-quite possibly a large
share-to encourage investment in overcoming the transaction costs of aggregation, Fennell,
Common Interest -Tragedies,supra note 41, at 963, but the aggregation should also redound to
the benefit of the original rights holders.
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to ensure that the resulting surplus is fairly allocated at the second
stage.
It is natural to address problems of coercive aggregation in
governance terms, as scholars approaching aggregate litigation from
the angles of political theory 123 and corporate governance1 24 have
noted. Indeed, the same fundamental problem is present in political
theory. Though he did not speak in those terms, Hobbes recognized a
form of anticommons in the state of nature, where the complete
autonomy of every individual made value-generating cooperation
impossible. 125 Only by surrendering their autonomy to a centralized
authority with coercive power could individuals overcome the
collective action problem and realize the gains from cooperation. For
Hobbes, the inevitable solution was monarchy; he was not particularly
concerned with the allocation stage. But, as Professor Samuel
Issacharoff has explained in drawing the analogy between governance
of the state and of class actions, political theory has progressed quite a
bit since Hobbes. 126 While all theories recognize that coercive power is
necessary for society to realize joint gain, the "legitimacy of any
particular governmental arrangement then turns on the ability to
curb oppressive, abusive, or self-serving behavior that may emerge
from within the newly created governing class." 127 In other words,
governance is how society goes about fairly allocating the gains from
cooperation.
Two of the central problems that political governance aims to
address are how to prevent the majority from oppressing the minority
and how to control agent opportunism once the power to override
individual consent is given to a governing authority.128 This was
James Madison's central insight in The Federalist 51, where he
explained: "In framing a government which is to be administered by
men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable
123. Samuel Issacharoff, Governanceand Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP.
CT. REV. 337, 338-39; see also NAGAREDA, supra note 34, at 219-23 (describing mass torts as a
"problem of governance").
124. Coffee, supra note 30, at 289-96; John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability:

Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 37577 (2000).
125. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 81-86 (1651) (describing man's state of nature as a
lawless condition of strife and war).
126. Issacharoff, supra note 123, at 339.
127. Id.
128. Cf. Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, supra note 41, at 983 n.265 (citing JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 65-73 (1962)) (stating that representative bodies must either
operate by unanimous consent or accept that the interests of some members will necessarily be
subordinated).
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the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it
to control itself."129 Thus, the U.S. Constitution aimed to create
structural protections-"[a] mbition must be made to counteract
ambition"-to prevent the tyranny of the majority and limit agent
opportunism.130 And judicial review serves as a backstop when these
structural protections fail. 131 Boiled down to its essentials, the social
contract creating a system of political governance consists of
individuals surrendering their autonomy and subjecting themselves to
majority rule in order to capture the surplus from cooperation, but
only with the assurance that structural protections-including judicial
review-are in place to protect them from exploitation at the hand of
their agents or the majority.
Likewise, the same set of problems is present in corporate
governance. As Ronald Coase explained, business firms are a response
to market failures, in the form of transaction costs and fear of
opportunism, that prevent people wishing to pool assets for profitable
projects from doing so through contracts alone. 132 In other words,
corporations offer a solution to the anticommons by consolidating the
assets of diffuse investors into a single entity that is subject to
hierarchical control and can allocate resources by fiat rather than by
unanimous agreement. 133 The resulting surplus is then distributed
among the investors in the form of dividends or increased share value.
Separating ownership and control in such a manner, of course, creates
agency problems and the risk of majority opportunism, but the law of
corporate governance has developed doctrines to mitigate these
problems.134 The corporate structure, therefore, largely solves the

129. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 281 (James Madison) (Benjamin Warner ed., 1818).
130. Id.; see also id. No. 10, at 50-56 (arguing for the necessity of limiting the effects of
factions by tilting the interests of such factions against those of others).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting that
heightened judicial review is warranted when legislation violates a provision of the Constitution,
distorts the political process, or targets "discrete and insular minorities"); JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87 (1980) (arguing that judicial
review should be applied to reinforce participation and representation in the democratic process);
cf. D. Theodore Rave, Politiciansas Fiduciaries,126 HARv. L. REV. 671, 676-79 (2013) (arguing
that courts should take an active role in limiting incumbent self-dealing).
132. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-92 (1937); see also OLIVER
E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 3-4 (1996) (developing nonstandard business
practices and organizational forms can be explained as an attempt to economize transaction
costs); Amnon Lehavi & Amir N. Licht, Eminent Domain, Inc., 107 COLUM L. REV. 1704, 1732-33
(2007) (consolidating assets in a single entity subject to hierarchical control is the key to
overcoming the transaction costs of opportunism).
133. Lehavi & Licht, supranote 132, at 1733.
134. Id. at 1736.
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anticommons by denying each shareholder a veto while providing
sophisticated defenses against majority abuse and agent disloyalty.135
As long as there are adequate governance procedures in place
to ensure that the burdens and gains from cooperation are fairly
allocated at the second stage, the use of coercion at the first stage can
be justified. Thus the legitimacy of both regulatory and contractual
strategies for overcoming an anticommons depends on (1) their ability
to generate a surplus through aggregation and (2) the presence of an
internal governance procedure that will address the agency and
tyranny-of-the-majority problems and allow the parties to the
aggregation to fairly divide up the surplus. Indeed, as the next Part
will illustrate, this pattern is typical of many areas of law. The third
strategy for defeating the anticommons-the use of force or
intimidation-is plainly illegitimate on these grounds, but it cannot be
ignored as the potential for a surplus may induce parties to resort to
illegal means to capture it, particularly when the background legal
rules prevent the use of other strategies.
III. ATTACKING THE ANTICOMMONS IN OTHER AREAS OF LAW

Using coercion to defeat an anticommons and achieve
coordinated gains is a familiar move in the law. Several areas of law
exhibit the same two-stage dynamic as aggregate litigation, but,
instead of slavishly insisting on individual autonomy, they employ
regulatory or contractual strategies to overcome anticommons
problems. Whichever strategy is adopted, the use of coercion at the
first stage is typically conditioned on-and legitimized by-the
presence of governance procedures to ensure that the resulting
surplus is fairly allocated at the second stage. Some of these solutions
work so well that it is easy to overlook the underlying anticommons
dynamic. Nevertheless, these two-stage responses hold important
lessons for addressing the anticommons in aggregate litigation.
A. Regulatory Solutions
An anticommons can often be a justification for regulation.136
Here, I survey examples of regulatory responses to anticommons

135. Id. at 1748. A similar approach to class actions would view the class as an "entity." See
David L. Shapiro, ClassActions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 919
(1998).

136. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 779-81 (1973); Michael Heller & Rick Hills,
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problems in four areas: land assembly, admiralty, bankruptcy, and oil
and gas extraction. While they do not all promise never to leave any
individual worse off, their use of coercion is legitimized in part by the
fairness of the procedures used at the allocation stage and their
attention to the governance problems of limiting agency costs and
minority exploitation. Because the power of the state is used to
override individual consent, procedural attention to allocation is
particularly important.
1. Land Assembly Through Eminent Domain
The classic example of a regulatory solution to an anticommons
problem is the use of eminent domain for land assembly. It is also one
of the more problematic examples. States turn to eminent domain
when contiguous parcels of land owned by many individuals could be
put to better use as a single larger parcel, but transaction costs and
holdouts make assembly through voluntary transactions prohibitively
costly.
Eminent domain is a two-stage process.137 First, in the
aggregation stage, the state takes the property from the dispersed
owners, assembles it into a more valuable whole, and transfers it to a
higher-value user. Second, in the allocation stage, the state provides a
process for paying "just compensation" to the individual property
owners.138 This process is typically a judicial determination of the
objective "fair market value" of the property prior to the taking. 139
The use of government coercion to make the aggregation
possible is justified by the anticommons dynamic; the land assembly
will create value but the potential for holdouts prevents assembly
through market transactions. 14 0 Still, the use of eminent domain for
large-scale development projects remains controversial. Much of the
resistahce-particularly in the wake of Kelo v. City of New
London' 4 1-stems from the fact that the surplus generated by
aggregation is not shared with the original landowners. Under current
doctrine, the original landowners are only entitled to the preproject
Land Assembly Districts,121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1470 (2008) ("[T'he traditional solution to such
a tragedy of the anticommons [is] a call for the Leviathan . . .
137. Lehavi & Licht, supra note 132, at 1732.
138. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
139. E.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, More or Less, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979).
140. E.g., Merrill, supra note 69, at 74-81. But see Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use"

Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private
Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (2006) (arguing that private developers, unlike government
entities, can use undisclosed purchasing agents to avoid holdouts).
141. 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005).
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fair market value of their property. 142 The bundler (either the state or
a private developer working with the state) gets the entire bundling
surplus.
This is problematic not only because it can result in an unfair
allocation if the original landowners do not share in the bundling
surplus, but also because it can lead to inefficient assembly. 143
Without a procedure at the allocation stage to ensure that the original
landowners share in the surplus, bargaining power is shifted in favor
of developers. And there is a risk that public officials and developers
will collude to use eminent domain for projects that do not, in fact,
generate value over current land uses but confer a concentrated
benefit on the developer and achieve some public benefit (such as
increased tax revenues) at the expense of a discrete minority of
undercompensated landowners. 144
2. Law of General Average Contribution
While eminent domain is problematic at the allocation stage, a
venerable admiralty doctrine provides an example of a two-stage
regulatory response to an anticommons dynamic that does leave every
party better off. The law of general average contribution involuntarily
imposes a temporary aggregation of property rights with an ingenious
mechanism of allocation that legitimizes the aggregation and thwarts
strategic behavior.
When a ship faces peril at sea, the captain has a duty to
jettison as much cargo as necessary to save the ship and the
remaining cargo. 145 In choosing which cargo to toss overboard, the
captain would act most efficiently if he were the sole owner of the ship
and all of the cargo-he would start with items of great bulk but little
142. E.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943). And any consumer surplus
(after all, the landowners did not want to sell at fair market value) is lost. E.g., Coniston Corp. v.
Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.).
143. Calls for reform at the allocation stage range from increasing the measure of
compensation (e.g., to 150% of fair market value), Merrill, supra note 69, at 90-91, to more
sophisticated governance schemes that would give landowners shares in a corporation holding
the assembled property, Lehavi & Licht, supra note 132, at 1734-35, or allow landowners to vote
on whether to assemble their land and sell to a developer, Heller & Hills, supra note 136, at
1469-71.
144. E.g., Heller & Hills, supra note 136, at 1481-82; Lehavi & Licht, supra note 132, at
1715, 1718, 1732; Merrill, supranote 69, at 86-87; cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 89, at 98 (contending
that a compensation scheme that does not divide the surplus either pro rata or to promote
competitive behavior is unlikely to lead to the socially optimal outcome).
145. E.g., Mouse's Case, (1609) 66 Eng. Rep. 1341 (K.B.); 12 Co. Rep. 63; see also Barnard v.
Adams, 51 U.S. 270, 303-07 (1850) (discussing the law of general average contribution in the
admiralty context).
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value-leaving the collective better off.146 But cargo is typically owned
by many different shippers, none of whom would wish their cargo to be
jettisoned to save the cargo of others.
To give the captain the proper incentives to maximize collective
welfare at the first stage, the doctrine of general average contribution
temporarily imposes common ownership where fragmented ownership
is at the wrong scale for efficient decisionmaking. 147 The captain is
permitted to jettison the necessary cargo and then allocate the loss
among all of the shippers and the owner of the hull in proportion to
the value saved.148 The trick in ensuring a fair allocation at the second
stage is to get accurate valuations of all the cargo being shipped. 149
But as long as shippers are required to declare the value of their goods
ex ante, each will have an incentive to do so honestly to avoid the
possibility that his undervalued goods will be jettisoned or that he will
be required to bear a larger portion of the loss for his overvalued
goods. 150 And by allocating the loss among all of the owners according
to the declared value of the goods-effectively aggregating ownership
for the duration of the emergency-every cargo owner benefits when
the captain maximizes aggregate value for the group. 15 1
Several conditions make this elegant system of self-declaration
work. First, the declared valuation determines the allocation of both
costs and benefits of the aggregation. Second, the declaration is done
ex ante before heterogeneities among shippers arise, that is before
shippers know whether they will pay or receive compensation for
jettisoned cargo. And third, shippers are in a good position to know
their valuations ex ante.
Unfortunately, these conditions are rarely present in aggregate
litigation. Plaintiffs will rarely be able to accurately value their claims
in advance, before the opportunity for factual development and
discovery. And because it is the defendant, not a subset of the
plaintiffs, who will bear the costs, all plaintiffs will have incentives to
overstate the value of their claims. When these conditions are absent,
regulatory responses to the anticommons dynamic must take different

146. Epstein, supra note 116, at 582-84.
147. Anticommons problems can be understood as problems of scale. See Fennell, supra note
15, at 37-39. The right scale for efficiently deciding which cargo to jettison would be a complete
aggregation of all of the cargo and the hull in the hands of a single owner. But where ownership
in a resource best used at an aggregated scale-like the ship and cargo-is fragmented,
transaction costs and strategic behavior can result in inefficient decisionmaking.
148. Epstein, supra note 116, at 582.
149. Id. at 582-83.
150. Id. at 583.
151. Id.
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approaches. But the law of general average contribution demonstrates
that when the allocation process can guarantee that every individual
will share proportionally in the surplus, it makes little sense to object
that individual autonomy is overridden when rights are aggregated.
3. Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy is perhaps the most well-developed two-stage
regulatory example. Creditors in bankruptcy face the collective action
problems typical of the anticommons.1 52 The debtor firm is often worth
more as a going concern than liquidated, but the rights to extract
payments (or liquidation value) from the debtor are dispersed among
many creditors. If each creditor could demand full payment or force
liquidation, the value generated by keeping the debtor firm together
as a going concern would be lost-the classic run-on-the-bank

scenario. 153
Bankruptcy law starts with the assumption that collective
resolution is necessary in order to maximize value at the first stage.154
It thus compels aggregation by bringing all creditors together in a
single proceeding to reorganize the debtor and imposing an automatic
stay on all other proceedings against the debtor. 155 Bankruptcy
disarms potential holdouts by shifting decisionmaking authority from
the individual creditors to the group. Approval of the plan for
reorganization does not require unanimous consent, but rather a
supermajority vote. 156 And the bankruptcy court has the ability to
"cram down" a plan even over the objection of a class of dissenting
creditors.157

But bankruptcy legitimizes this compelled participation at the
first stage with a well-developed set of governance procedures
designed to protect the minority, control agency costs, and fairly
allocate the resulting surplus at the second stage.

152. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648,
650-53 (2010) (asserting that trends toward securitization and the rise of distressed-debt
professionals have resulted in fragmentation of rights typical of anticommons).
153. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10-13 (1986)
(describing bankruptcy law as a solution for a common pool problem in which individuals race to
extract resources).

154. Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 963 (2012).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2006); 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2006). Any creditors who decline to
participate have their claims discharged in their absence. 11 U.S.C. § 501.
156. 11 U.S.C. § 1126.
157. Id. § 1129(b)(1).
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Valuation of rights in bankruptcy is not always as simple as
the shippers' ex ante declarations in admiralty law, as claims against
the debtor may be disputed or contingent on future events. But
through a claims-allowance procedure, the bankruptcy court estimates
the value of claims against the debtor and assigns voting rights to
creditors accordingly. 15 8 These estimates, at least for the purposes of
allocating votes, need not be exact.159
The voting procedures in bankruptcy are designed to prevent a
majority of creditors from adopting a plan that oppresses a discrete
minority. Thus to deal with heterogeneities among creditors and
protect the minority, creditors must be sorted, for voting purposes,
into classes based on whether their claims are substantially similar
and of the same level of priority.160 Voting is done on both a pro rata
and per capita basis. Approval of the reorganization plan requires an
affirmative vote in each class by a supermajority (two-thirds) by claim
amount as well as a majority by number of claims. 16 1 And while the
objections of a dissenting class can be overridden, the "cram down"
procedure requires the court to first find that the plan is "fair and
equitable" and will not "discriminate unfairly" against any
creditors. 62 Indeed, a plan may not be approved over the objection of
any impaired class of creditors if it violates the rule of "absolute
priority" by making any allocation to junior creditors or shareholders
before the senior creditors are paid in full. 63 Thus, judicial review for
fair treatment of the minority and horizontal equity in the allocation
(on the basis of rights existing prior to bankruptcy) trumps any
decision by the majority.164
Structural protections are also in place to control agency costs.
Representation through creditors' committees gives creditors some
voice in the negotiations and helps to monitor lawyers, bankers, and
other agents to prevent self-dealing.165 The United States Trustee acts
158. Id. § 502.
159. Id. § 502(c)(1); see also, e.g., Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 643 (2d Cir.
1988) (valuing each pending asbestos claim at one dollar for the purpose of voting).
160. 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a).
161. Id. § 1126.
162. Id. § 1129(b)(1); see also McKenzie, supra note 154, at 1008.
163. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2). See generally Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. 203 N.
LaSalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434 (1999).
164. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 93, at 41 ("A plan with majority support can still be
unfair to a particular dissenter . . . ."); Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving
Enterprise-ThreateningMass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045, 2065-66 (2000) ("A plan
may be confirmed despite rejection by a class, but only if the plan is 'fair and equitable' and does
not unfairly discriminate with respect to the non-accepting class.").
165. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a); McKenzie, supranote 154, at 1009-10.
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as an independent institutional monitor tasked with overseeing the
overall progress of the bankruptcy case and policing self-dealing
behavior by agents. 166 And the entire reorganization process takes
place under the supervision of the bankruptcy court.
Finally, bankruptcy provides a backstop to ensure that the
reorganization is in the "best interests" of the creditors.167 The
reorganization happens in the shadow of liquidation, which provides a
benchmark for assessing the fairness of intercreditor allocations.168
Even if an individual creditor's class votes to approve the plan, the
dissenting creditor is still entitled to receive at least as much value as
it would have received in liquidation.169 Bankruptcy thus ensures that
every creditor is at least as well off as part of the collective as it would
have been had no reorganization occurred.170
Thus, despite difficulties in valuation and heterogeneities
among creditors, bankruptcy is able to impose a value-generating
aggregation of rights while still ensuring that the individual rights
holders share in the joint gains and are not exploited by their agents
or the majority.
Indeed, bankruptcy has been the only method able to provide
some degree of closure in the asbestos litigation morass. Section 524(g)
of the bankruptcy code allows debtors to set up a trust for payment of
asbestos claims and to obtain a "channeling injunction" that forces all
asbestos claims-present and future-against the debtor into the trust
if, on top of the normal voting requirements, 75% of asbestos
claimants approve the plan of reorganization.171 Although its
treatment of future claimants is not entirely satisfactory, section
524(g) gives asbestos claimants a real collective voice in the
reorganization without empowering holdouts to block an
advantageous resolution. While section 524(g) is limited to asbestos
bankruptcies, Professor Troy McKenzie has suggested that
166. See 11 U.S.C.

§§ 307, 1102(a); 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(A) (2006); McKenzie, supra note

154, at 1009-10, 1020-21.

167.
168.
169.
170.

11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
See Hagan, supra note 66, at 342.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
Resnick, supra note 164, at 2064. The best-interests-of-the-creditors standard ensures

that reorganization is a Pareto improvement over the worst-case outcome-liquidation-but does
not contemplate any form of second-best informal aggregation that creditors might attempt if the

bankruptcy framework were not available, such as a contractual bond workout. If an analogous
standard were applied in aggregate litigation, plaintiffs with negative-value claims would receive
no protection, and because the relevant comparator is going it alone rather than pursuing some
form of informal aggregation, even large claims may be negative value if they require expensive
factual development and expert testimony that a lawyer could not amortize over many cases.
171. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
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bankruptcy can supply a useful model for aggregate litigation more
broadly. 17 2
4. Oil and Gas Unitization
Compulsory unitization for extraction of oil and gas from a
common pool provides a final regulatory example. Oil and gas
reservoirs typically underlie multiple parcels of land, and many
property owners or leaseholders hold rights to exploit the common
pool. Because the resources are mobile within the reservoir and, under
the "rule of capture," each owner is allowed to keep as much of the oil
and gas as he or she can extract, the overextraction and attendant
waste typical of a tragedy of the commons is predictable. 173 The
property owners therefore stand to gain tremendously if they can
cooperate and treat the oil reservoir as a single owner would, either by
selling all of their property to a single buyer or by entering a
unitization agreement. 174 Unitization is an arrangement where all of
the owners exchange their individual holdings in the reservoir for
shares of a single, commonly managed enterprise that will make
decisions about the most efficient way to exploit the resources and
then divide the proceeds among the owners according to some
predetermined rule. 175
But achieving such cooperation has proven exceedingly difficult
because the need to obtain each individual property holder's consent to
a voluntary unitization agreement presents an anticommons
dynamic.176 Transaction costs stemming from the number of
stakeholders and potential for holdouts frequently frustrate

172. McKenzie, supra note 154.

173. See Vijay Mohan & Prateek Goorha, Competition and Unitization in Oil Extraction:A
Tale of Two Tragedies, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 519, 519 (2008) (arguing that multiplicity of interests
and the rule of capture ensure that the oil industry is susceptible to a tragedy of the commons);
see also Fennell, supra note 15, at 38 (explaining tragedy of the commons).
174. See, e.g., Owen L. Anderson & Ernest E. Smith, Exploratory Unitization Under the

2004 Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act: Leveling the PlayingField, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENvTL. L. 277, 278, 284 (2004) [hereinafter Anderson & Smith, Exploratory Unitization]
(explaining that unitization increases total recovery by maintaining efficient levels of pressure in
reservoir and reduces waste, environmental impact, and conflicts with surface owners); Owen L.

Anderson & Ernest E. Smith, The Use of Law to Promote Domestic Exploration and Production,
PROc. FIFrIETH ANN. INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 2-1, 2-64-2-76 (1999).
175. Fennell, supra note 15, at 38; Gary D. Libecap & James L. Smith, The Economic

Evolution of Petroleum PropertyRights in the United States, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 589, 591 (2002).
176. Fennell, supra note 15, at 43 (observing that an anticommons dynamic stands in the
way of attempts to overcome tragedy of the commons through contract); see also Libecap &
Smith, supra note 175, at 591-97 (providing the historical development of petroleum property
rights and noting the difficulty of writing unitization contracts).
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negotiations for private unitization arrangements.17 7 Private
unitization agreements tend to be achievable at the exploration stage,
when parties effectively negotiate from behind a veil of ignorance.178
But agreements tend to be particularly difficult to reach for existing
reservoirs where heterogeneity among incumbent stakeholders and
cognitive biases lead to disagreements over plans of allocation.179 And
because voluntary unitization requires unanimous consent, each
property holder is a potential holdout.
To reduce transaction costs and the risk of holdouts, most
petroleum-producing states have adopted compulsory unitization laws,
which allow a supermajority of owners to impose a cooperative regime
on dissenting minorities. 180 Following the now-familiar two-stage
structure, compulsory unitization schemes have sophisticated
governance procedures to ensure that the surplus from a coerced
aggregation of rights is fairly allocated.
Compulsory unitization typically begins when a group of
owners who believe that unitized operations will enhance recovery
forms a steering committee to negotiate a reservoir-wide plan of
unitization. 181 The steering committee will determine a formula for
allocating the costs and benefits of joint resource extraction among all
of the owners and will appoint an agent-the unit operator-to
manage day-to-day operations. 182 Negotiating the allocation formula
can be difficult because interests are rarely homogenous. The formula
must take into account many factors beyond just the surface acreage
held by each owner, including the amount of oil under each tract, the
suitability of each tract for extraction, and existing wells operated by
each owner.183 But without the need for unanimous consent,
agreement is often possible.
Before it can take effect and bind dissenting parties, the
compulsory unitization plan must be ratified by a supermajority of the
177. Libecap & Smith, supra note 175, at 593-94; see also id. at 604-06 (describing thirty
years of failed negotiations in connection with an attempt to unitize oil and gas fields in Prudhoe
Bay, Alaska, despite tremendous potential for gain).
178. Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies,supra note 41, at 952 n.174.
179. Anderson & Smith, Exploratory Unitization, supra note 174, at 285; Fennell, Common
Interest Tragedies, supra note 41, at 952; Libecap & Smith, supra note 175, at 596.
180. Libecap & Smith, supra note 175, at 596.

181. Owen L. Anderson, Mutiny: The Revolt Against Unsuccessful Unit Operations, 30
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13-1, 13-3-13-8 (1984). See generally JOHN S. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 260-92 (5th ed. 2008).
182. Anderson, supra note 181, at 13-6-13-7.
183. Id. at 13-5-13-6; see, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.4(b) (West 2012). See generally 5
EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 78.2 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2012)
(discussing the creation, modification, and termination of units).
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interest owners in the proposed unit. 184 The required ratification
thresholds vary state-to-state from about 63% to 85%.185 Thus, a
handful of dissenting owners cannot block a beneficial unitization plan
or hold out for a disproportionate share of the surplus.
But the entire process takes place under the supervision of the
state conservation agency which reviews the unitization plan under
what is essentially the two-stage anticommons inquiry. 86 The agency
asks whether (1) the plan is economically feasible, will prevent waste,
and will result in additional recovery that substantially exceeds the
costs of unitized operations (i.e., whether the aggregation of rights
generates value) and (2) whether the allocation is "fair and equitable"
to all interest owners.1'87 In reviewing the fairness of the allocation,
the agency must ensure that the majority acted in good faith in
adopting the unitization plan and that the minority interests are
adequately protected and treated on the same terms as the
majority. 88 The allocation formula need not be perfect-a sort of
rough justice will often suffice' 89-but the majority cannot take
advantage of the minority through unequal treatment.190
Finally, in addition to protections against majority
opportunism, in some states the agent-the unit operator-owes
fiduciary duties to the property owners whose interests were joined by
compulsory unitizations.191
Compulsory unitization laws thus allow value-generating
aggregation to be imposed with less than unanimous consent, but only
with procedures designed to ensure that majority and agent
opportunism will be held in check and that all parties to the
aggregation will share in the joint gains. Even when valuation is
184. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1304-05 (West 2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. 52 § 287.5; see also
KUNTZ, supra note 183, § 78.2 (explaining that many states allow unitization to be imposed upon
minority interests).
185. Anderson, supra note 181, at 13-8.
186. KUNTZ, supra note 183, § 78.2.
187. E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 55-1304; see also Trees Oil Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 105 P.3d
1269, 1282 (Kan. 2005).
188. Trees Oil Co., 105 P.3d at 1277, 1285-86.
189. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm'n, 642 P.2d 773, 779-81 (Wyo. 1982)
("[S]ubstantial waste cannot be countenanced by a slavish devotion to correlative rights....
Justice was accomplished here, as much as could be under the circumstances.")
190. See, e.g., Williams v. Ark. Oil & Gas Comm'n, 817 S.W.2d 863 (Ark. 1991) (holding that
working-interest owners could not be forced to pay a greater percentage share of expenses than
their percentage share of production), overruled on other grounds by Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v.
Bruner, 243 S.W.3d 285 (Ark. 2006).
191. E.g., Hebble v. Shell Western E&P, Inc., 238 P.3d 939 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009); see also
KUNTZ, supra note 183, § 78.3 ("[I]t has been held that the unit stands in a fiduciary relation to
royalty owners in the unit. . . .").
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difficult and heterogeneities are present-just like in aggregate
litigation-oil and gas law, like bankruptcy, focuses on addressing
those problems and achieving equity in the allocation rather than
protecting individual owners' rights to veto uses of their property that
might lead to joint gains.
B. ContractualSolutions
In the absence of regulatory means of aggregation, parties have
sought to avoid or overcome anticommons problems by privately
aggregating their rights. The best examples are found in intellectual
property and sovereign debt where parties have sought to facilitate
cooperation, avoid holdout problems, and maximize collective value at
the first stage by contractually agreeing to be bound by nonunanimous
group decisions. In order to get all of the rights holders to agree at the
outset, these private governance arrangements typically must specify
a fair procedure for allocation at the second stage and provide
structural protections for the minority. And, unlike regulatory
solutions, the unanimous consent required at the front end lends great
legitimacy to the use of coercion to prevent would-be holdouts from
opting out at the back end. But even with such consent, judicial review
remains an important backstop. Courts sometimes use their equitable
powers to condition enforcement of such contractual arrangements on
agent faithfulness and fair treatment of the minority.
1. Copyright Collectives and Patent Pools
Copyright collectives and patent pools have emerged as private
contractual responses to the anticommons in intellectual property,
where increasingly fragmented ownership can make it difficult for
users to obtain all of the licenses needed to produce a product or
performance.192 The high transaction costs of contracting in the
anticommons dynamic sometimes drive intellectual property owners to
pool their rights into collectives that can dramatically lower the costs
of exchanging rights. 193 Copyright collectives and patent pools thus
192. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 20, at 698 (arguing that privatization of upstream
biomedical research in the United States may create anticommons). But see Epstein & Kuhlik,
supra note 59, at 54-58 (arguing that there is no biomedical anticommons).

193. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1302 (1996); see also Jonathan M.

Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J.
384 (2009) (exploring property regime selection in innovation markets); Carl Shapiro, Navigating

the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY
AND THE EcONOMY 119, 126-29, 134-36 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) ("[C]ross licenses and
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follow a two-stage structure: first, they contractually aggregate
intellectual property rights from diverse sources and price them for
sale to users in useful bundles, and, second, they establish internal
procedures for dividing licensing revenues. 194 In this way, intellectual
property holders can increase their joint welfare; but, unlike in
regulatory solutions, each individual must voluntarily opt in and cede
autonomy to the collective in exchange for procedural assurances of
fair treatment in the allocation stage.
The American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
("ASCAP"), for example, is one of the largest copyright collectives for
the music industry.195 It acts as a central depository, aggregating its
members' copyrights and issuing blanket licenses to media outlets like
radio and television stations, which would otherwise have to negotiate
with each copyright holder individually. ASCAP centrally sets the
rates for blanket licenses for each industry wishing to use songs. And
it monitors songs played through a combination of self-reporting by
licensees and random sampling and then divides up royalty income
among members according to a complex pro rata formula. 196 By
regularizing the process of determining approximate valuations
instead of negotiating royalties individually, parties can realize
significant transaction-cost savings.197 And copyright holders can take
advantage of economies of scale by centralizing monitoring and
enforcement functions. 9 8
But ASCAP also has detailed governance procedures to ensure
that the allocation of royalties is fair and that minorities are not
exploited. Royalties are split equally between composers and
publishers, and each group has equal representation on the board that
manages the organization.199 ASCAP has established rules for
amending its bylaws, voting (with votes weighted pro rata, not per

patent pools are two natural and effective methods used by market participants to cut through
the patent thicket."); cf. Michael Mattioili, Communities of Innovation, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 103,
152-54 (2012) (arguing that government intervention is often necessary to encourage private
parties to pool their rights).
194. Merges, supra note 193, at 1299, 1347.
195. About ASCAP, ASCAP, www.ascap.com/about (last visited Feb. 14, 2013). Interestingly,
ASCAP started in 1914 as a cost-spreading club for copyright litigation aimed at allowing
composers and publishers to amass enough capital and leverage to take on the New York City
nightclub owners who threatened a group boycott of any composer who challenged their flagrant
infringement practices. Merges, supranote 193, at 1329-30.
196. Merges, supra note 193, at 1329, 1335-37.
197. Id. at 1328, 1340-42.
198. Id. at 1319.
199. Id. at 1334.
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capita), and for the arbitration and appeal of disputes. 200 And it has
structural protections for minorities, including a guarantee that
"standard" (as opposed to "pop") composers and publishers would
retain representation on the board even as their numbers dwindled. 201
Patent pools operate similarly, allowing multiple patent
holders to assign their individual patent rights to a central entity for
collective exploitation through licensing or manufacturing, thereby
achieving tremendous transaction-cost savings. And like ASCAP, the
contracts creating patent pools specify detailed internal governance
structures that provide for valuation, distribution of royalties,
monitoring, and dispute resolution. 202
Copyright collectives and patent pools thus allow intellectual
property owners who opt in to enjoy a bundling surplus by exiting the
anticommons. And their aggregation of rights is legitimized both by
their consensual nature and the governance protections they
incorporate to ensure a fair allocation.
Unique intellectual property rights-just like plaintiffs' claims
in litigation-can be difficult to value, and much of the transactioncost savings offered by copyright collectives and patent pools comes
from using predetermined pricing grids or other methods of
approximate valuation instead of negotiating licenses individually.
Intellectual property owners thus trade precise valuation for the
bundling surplus in the hope that, because they are repeat players,
any inequities caused by imprecision will tend to even out over time.2 03
Settlement in litigation is, of course, a single-shot deal. But plaintiffs
may still be willing ex ante to trade precise valuations of their
individual claims for the scale economies and peace premium of an
aggregate settlement. After all, the primary way that settlement
generates value over litigation is by substituting a rough
approximation of claim value for a precise valuation at trial.
2. Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bonds
Probably the best example of a contractual solution to an
anticommons problem-and the one most analogous to the ALI's
proposal to allow plaintiffs to precommit to group decisions on
nonclass aggregate settlements-is the use of collective action clauses
in sovereign bond contracts.

200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1338-39 & n.150.
1338.
1360.
1345.
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As explained above, restructuring a sovereign's debt before
default is often in the best interests of both the sovereign and its
creditors-that is, restructuring can generate value. 204 But an
anticommons stands in the way of a successful restructuring, which
would require dispersed bondholders to agree to take a haircut.
Because there is no international bankruptcy system to bring
everyone together in a coordinated proceeding, the creditors and
sovereign debtor must work out a restructuring contractually. 205
Traditionally, the boilerplate used in most sovereign bond contracts
required the unanimous consent of bondholders to modify the bond's
payment terms, making it easy for an opportunistic bondholder to hold
up the restructuring process in the hope of extracting a side
payment. 206 But in the wake of the sovereign debt crises of the late
1990s, countries and bondholders (at the encouragement of the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF")) attempted to limit the power of
holdouts by adopting collective action clauses. 207
Collective action clauses allow a supermajority (typically 75%)
of bondholders to modify the payment terms of all of the bonds in the
same bond issuance. 208 Thus, as part of a restructuring, a
supermajority can agree to take a haircut by reducing the amount due
or deferring payment, and that decision will bind all of the
bondholders in the same issuance, even those who voted against the
modification. Collective action clauses solve the holdout problem by
shifting from a unanimity rule to a supermajority-voting rule.
By purchasing bonds with collective action clauses,
bondholders effectively agree in advance to be bound by a group
decision in the event of a restructuring-essentially the move that the
aggregate settlement rule prevents plaintiffs from making in
litigation. Empowering the group to guarantee complete participation
puts creditors in the best position to negotiate the terms of the
restructuring with the sovereign debtor without fear that holdouts will
block the deal or siphon off value through side payments. Indeed,
collective action clauses were successfully used to obtain near-

204. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
205. See Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will, 51
EMORY L.J. 1317, 1322 (2002) [hereinafter Buchheit & Gulati, Collective Will] (discussing the
search for measures to facilitate sovereign debt workouts). In the early 2000s, the IMF pushed
for a more formalized bankruptcy system for sovereign debt, but the proposal was rejected in
favor of the increased use of collective action clauses. Hagan, supra note 66, at 335-36.
206. See, e.g., Bratton & Gulati, supra note 93, at 3-4, 6, 20-21.
207. See Hagan, supra note 66, at 319-20.
208. See, e.g., Buchheit & Gulati, Collective Will, supra note 205, at 1321; Hagan, supranote
66, at 317-18.
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complete participation in restructuring Ukraine's sovereign debt in
2000 and Uruguay's debt in 2003.209
Contrast collective action clauses with coercive exit consentsthe other tool that sovereign debtors use to avoid holdouts in
restructuring. 210 Unlike exit consents, which discourage holdouts by
destroying the liquidity and value of bonds outside of the
restructuring, collective action clauses allow bondholders to express
opposition to the terms of the restructuring by voting against it, while
still sharing in the collective benefits of the restructuring if they are
outvoted. 211 Thus, with collective action clauses, bondholders can vote
their true preferences, providing an important voice-based check on
inadequate restructuring terms. 212 Because of this feature, collective
action clauses-unlike coercive exit consents-do not result in
haircuts that leave the creditors worse off collectively than if no
restructuring had occurred (assuming no collusion or side
payments).213 The supermajority-voting rules of collective action
clauses, again unlike exit consents, do not shift leverage from the
creditors to the sovereign debtor, but only from individual creditors to
the group. 214
Although collective action clauses have great potential to allow
bondholders to maximize their collective benefit at the first stage, by
shifting from a unanimity rule to a supermajority rule they create the
risks that conflicts of interest may arise among groups of creditors and
that the majority may collude with the debtor to take advantage of the
minority at the allocation stage. 215 Indeed, in the 1930s, equity holders
frequently took advantage of collective action clauses in domestic
corporate bonds to buy up controlling positions in their own distressed
debt and then vote to amend the bond contracts to cancel the debt over
the objection of the minority. 216 It was this practice that led to the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939's prohibition on modifying a domestic
corporate bond's payment terms with less than unanimous consent
209. Hagan, supra note 66, at 319; see also INT'L MONETARY FUND, INVOLVING THE PRIVATE
SECTOR IN THE RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL CRISES-RESTRUCTURING INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGN
BONDS 6, Box 2.3 (2001) (discussing Ukraine's 2000 restructuring); Buchheit & Gulati, Collective
Will, supra note 205, at 1346 (same).
210. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
211. See Bi, Chamon & Zettelmeyer, supranote 99, at 16-17.
212. See generally HIRSCHMAN, supra note 103.
213. Bi, Chamon & Zettelmeyer, supra note 99, at 4, 16-17.
214. See id. at 17; cf. Hagan, supra note 66, at 343-44 (explaining how the majority voting
rules of the IMF's proposed international bankruptcy scheme would shift leverage from
individual creditors to the group, not to the sovereign debtor).
215. See Buchheit & Gulati, Collective Will, supra note 205, at 1336.
216. See Buchheit & Gulati, Exit Consents, supra note 97, at 66-67.
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outside the protections of formal bankruptcy proceedings. 217 And part
of some private creditors' skepticism toward the push to adopt
collective action clauses in sovereign bonds (which are not subject to
the Trust Indenture Act) in the early 2000s may have stemmed from
the lack of any explicit good-faith requirement that would prevent
majorities from cutting side deals with sovereign debtors to exploit
minorities. 218 The ability to hold out is the individual's weapon against
exploitation, though it also makes it difficult to maximize collective
value. Individuals thus need assurances that they will not be exploited
before they can be expected to surrender their autonomy.
Sovereign issuers and bondholders have responded to these
concerns by incorporating structural protections into their bond
contracts to ensure a fair allocation. Uruguay's sovereign bond
contracts, for example, contain several antimanipulation features,
such as disclosure requirements, prohibitions on exit consents, and
disenfranchisement of bonds controlled by the sovereign debtor, to
prevent the debtor from colluding with the majority to use collective
action clauses to exploit the minority. 219 These contractual protections
have helped reassure investors that the benefits and burdens of
restructuring will be fairly allocated at stage two.2 20 And, combined
with each bondholder's consent at the outset, these governance
features help legitimize the use of coercion to compel the minority to
participate in a value-generating restructuring at stage one.
The major limitation of collective action clauses is that they
only bind bondholders within the same bond issuance. 221 A
supermajority vote in favor of restructuring by the bondholders in one
217. 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp (2006); see Buchheit & Gulati, Exit Consents, supra note 97, at 67.
218. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 93, at 7-8, 54, 60-62, 78-79. The market was initially
slow to embrace collective action clauses, despite the potential for joint gains-a reluctance that
has also been attributed by some to path dependence in the boilerplate language taken from
domestic bonds. Buchheit & Gulati, Collective Will, supra note 205, at 1328-29, 1335; see also
Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, The Use of Collective Action Clauses in New York Law
Bonds of Sovereign Borrowers, 35 GEO. J. INT'L L. 815, 815 (2004) (finding that some issuers
inadvertently departed from market convention and used collective action clauses in New York
bond issues before 2003 when they relied on the London office of a U.S. law firm to draft the
contracts); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contract Evolution
3-4 (Chi. Inst. Law & Econ., Olin Research Paper No. 605), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2093598&download=yes (tracing the shift in boilerplate language
in sovereign bond contracts for issuances under New York law toward collective action clauses
and away from unanimity action clauses). Others have attributed that reluctance to creditors'
expectations that difficulties in restructuring caused by the need for unanimous consent would
make unconditional IMF bailouts more likely. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 93, at 4, 51-52.
219. Buchheit & Gulati, Model CAC, supra note 60, at 322-24; Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah
S. Pam, Uruguay's Innovations, 19 J. INT'L BANKING L. & REG. 28, 30-31 (2004).
220. See Buchheit & Pam, supra note 219, at 30-31.
221. Buchheit & Gulati, Collective Will, supra note 205, at 1344.
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issuance cannot prevent creditors with other bonds issued by the
sovereign from holding out. Thus a "second-order anticommons"
dynamic can exist across bond issuances. To successfully restructure,
the sovereign debtor must separately secure the agreement of a
supermajority in each series of bonds. 222 This creates the potential for
opportunistic vulture funds to buy up a blocking position in a single
bond issuance and hold out for a side payment or other favorable
treatment. 223
While collective action clauses are vulnerable to a second-order
anticommons problem, by allowing group decisionmaking within each
bond issuance they at least reduce the number of players who must
coordinate in order to achieve a successful restructuring. 224 A more
comprehensive solution would apply a supermajority-voting rule
across bond issuances. 225 Along these lines, some countries, such as
Uruguay, have adopted "aggregated collective action clauses," which
allow modification of bond contracts with the approval of 85% of all
outstanding bonds together with approval by two-thirds of the bonds
in each series. 226
3. Pre-Bankruptcy Era Corporate Reorganizations
The anticommons and governance concerns in sovereign debt
restructuring mirror earlier concerns present in domestic corporate
restructurings in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Before the Bankruptcy Code's corporate-reorganization provisions
(Chapter 11 and its predecessors) were adopted, many corporate bonds
included collective action clauses for the same reasons that sovereign
bonds do today-to mitigate the collective action problems that faced
creditors and debtors in restructuring outside of a regulatory
framework. 227
222. See id.
223. See Hagan, supra note 66, at 320-22.
224. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1330 (1993)
("[T]ransaction costs tend to increase with the number of individuals involved.").
225. See Hagan, supra note 66, at 322 & n.67.
226. Buchheit & Gulati, Model CAC, supra note 60, at 319; see also Buchheit & Pam, supra
note 219. The Dominican Republic in 2004 and Argentina in 2005 followed suit, and all new
Eurozone bond contracts will include similar clauses. Buchheit & Gulati, Model CAC, supra note
60, at 317-19; see also Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism ch. 4, art. 12, 3,
Feb.
2,
2012,
available at
http://www.european-council.europa.eulmedia/582311/05tesm2.enl2.pdf ("Collective action clauses shall be included, as of 1 January 2013, in all new
euro area government securities, with maturity above one year, in a way which ensures that
their legal impact is identical.").
227. See Buchheit & Gulati, Collective Will, supra note 205, at 1327-28 (discussing history
and use of collective action clauses up through creation of Securities and Exchange Commission);
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Courts, however, recognized the risk of strategic action.
Because it can be difficult to specify in advance, and therefore
contractually prohibit, all of the potential ways that a debtor might
collude with the majority to exploit the minority, contractual
protections negotiated by bondholders are not always sufficient to
legitimize compelled participation in a restructuring. Pre-bankruptcy
era case law therefore imposed implied fiduciary or good-faith duties
on creditors in the majority who sought to use collective action clauses
to impose restructuring on a dissenting minority. 228 Such transactions
were thus subject to judicial scrutiny for the two governance concerns:
self-dealing by insiders and unfair treatment of minority creditors. 229
Importantly, these intercreditor duties derived from equitable
principles, not from any concern about the lack of sophistication on the
part of bondholders. 230
As early as 1879, the Supreme Court in Sage v. Central
Railroad Co. conditioned enforcement of a collective action clause on
fair treatment of the minority bondholders. 231 The Court upheld
restructuring by majority vote as "reasonable" only because the
majority did not attempt to convey benefits to itself at the minority's
expense; rather, the restructuring plan, which distributed shares in
the reorganized company to all bondholders pro rata, "inure[d] equally
to the benefit alike of the majority and minority." 2 3 2
Likewise, in 1896, the Second Circuit invalidated an attempt to
use a collective action clause to postpone payments on corporate bonds
in Hackettstown National Bank v. D.G. Yuengling Brewing Co. 2 33
There, David Yuengling, principal shareholder in the eponymous
brewery, enlisted his brother-in-law, John Betz, to buy up enough of
the brewery's bonds that together with the Yuengling family they
would control 75% of the outstanding bonds-enough to make use of

see also Randall Klein & Danielle Juhle, Majority Rules: Non-Cash Bids and the Reorganization
Sale, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 297, 310-11, 313 (2010) (discussing historical use of majority rule in
bond workouts).
228. See Bratton & Gulati, supra note 93, at 70-71; Buchheit & Gulati, Collective Will,
supra note 205, at 1336-37; cf. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel B. Fischel, Contract and
Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 437 (1993) (arguing that fiduciary duties are implied when
costs of specifying contractual terms are prohibitively high).
229. Buchheit & Gulati, Collective Will, supra note 205, at 1337-38.
230. Klein & Juhle, supranote 227, at 305-07 & n.37 (citing cases).
231. 99 U.S. 334, 340 (1879).
232. Id. at 341; see also Klein & Juhle, supra note 227, at 300-04 (interpreting Sage's
holding and subsequent application).
233. 74 F. 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1896).
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the collective action clause. 234 Although the company had defaulted on
interest payments to the bondholders, Yuengling agreed to personally
pay the coupon rate on Betz's bonds and held an option to purchase
them. 23 5 Betz called a meeting, and the majority voted to postpone all
interest payments on the bonds for five years. 236 The Second Circuit,
however, held that the majority could not collusively bind the minority
to terms that are "not in the common interest of all." 2 37 The court
explained:
Agreements between bondholders lodging in the majority in interest the power of control
over the common fund contemplate that those having the largest interest in its
conservation will be the most zealous. They are intended to minimize the power of the
factious minority to thwart the general good. But every delegation of power implies that
238
it will be honestly exercised.

In other words, bondholders could agree in advance to group
decisionmaking in order to advance their collective welfare, but the
majority would bear a duty of "utmost good faith" toward the minority,
and courts would supervise the majority's use of its power to ensure
that it did not exploit the minority or collude with insiders. 239
Development of the law of intercreditor duties in the United
States atrophied in the late 1930s when the Trust Indenture Act
ended the use of collective action clauses in corporate bonds and
restructuring shifted to the bankruptcy system, with its own tools for
protecting the minority. 240 But English law, which has remained more
open to collective action clauses, continues to recognize the duty of the
majority to deal fairly with the minority. 241 And Professors William
Bratton and Mitu Gulati have argued that the shift in the sovereign
bond market from unanimous consent to collective action clauses

234. Id. at 111; see Klein & Juhle, supra note 227, at 306-07 (discussing and interpreting
Hackettstown and its attempt to preserve commercial expectations).
235. Hackettstown, 74 F. at 111.
236. Id. at 112.
237. Id. at 112-14.
238. Id. at 113.
239. Id. at 112.
240. See Buchheit & Gulati, Collective Will, supra note 205, at 1338-39.
241. E.g., Redwood Master Fund Ltd. v. TD Bank Eur. Ltd., [2002] EWHC (Ch) 2703; see
also Bratton & Gulati, supra note 93, at 72-74 (noting English courts' recognition of the
obligation of the majority to "exercise its amendment power in good faith"); Klein & Juhle, supra
note 227, at 325 & n. 104 ("[Pjrecedent generally held that the majority rule would be enforced so
long as the underlying instrument authorized such action and the majority exercised its power in
good faith.").
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should be accompanied by increased judicial scrutiny of their use to
ensure fair treatment of the minority. 242
As these cases demonstrate, judicial review for good faith and
fair treatment of the minority can be an important supplement to
contractual governance structures in legitimizing compelled
participation in a value-generating aggregation of rights. And, just as
they do in constitutional law, courts can serve as a backstop against
minority exploitation and agent self-dealing when individuals cede
their autonomy to the group in search of joint gains. 243
This range of examples shows that using coercion to bundle
rights is a common and legitimate strategy for defeating an
anticommons. While the problems in different contexts call for
different governance approaches at stage two, all share a common
concern for protecting the minority and preventing agent
opportunism. Attacking the anticommons in mass litigation may
require specifically tailored governance strategies, but two
fundamental insights remain the same: that slavish devotion to
individual autonomy can frustrate joint gains and that governance can
legitimize coercive aggregation.
IV. OVERCOMING THE ANTICOMMONS IN AGGREGATE LITIGATION

Recognizing the anticommons dynamic in aggregate litigation
and the two-stage problem that it poses for plaintiffs can help us
understand and critique features of the law governing aggregate
litigation and settlements. In the first stage, the negotiation phase,
where cooperation may lead to joint gains, the goal should be to
maximize aggregate value. This may require that some party-most
likely a lawyer-bundle the disparate rights together for sale to the
defendant as a unit, which typically will require the rights assembler
to acquire coercive power over the rights holders to reduce transaction
costs and prevent holdouts. In the second stage, the allocation phase,
the plaintiffs must divide up the resulting proceeds-from their
perspective a limited fund-in what is now a zero-sum game.
Where individual plaintiffs surrender their autonomy at stage
one in pursuit of the peace premium, they can no longer ensure for
242. Bratton & Gulati, supra note 93, at 76-79. Modern U.S. courts have neither embraced
nor foreclosed intercreditor duties for sovereign bonds. See Buchheit & Gulati, Collective Will,
supra note 205, at 1340-41.
243. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition . . . which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."); ELY, supra note 131.
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themselves that the settlement allocation will be to their benefit. But,
as approaches to similar problems in other areas of law demonstrate,
an arrangement that compels participation at stage one to defeat an
anticommons problem can be legitimized by the presence of
governance structures that ensure that the gains from cooperation are
equitably distributed at stage two. The law governing aggregate
litigation should thus be structured to allow for value-generating
aggregation at stage one and to require procedures for equitable
allocation at stage two.
Potential solutions to the anticommons in aggregate litigation
range from regulatory approaches (like class actions) to contractual
approaches (like precommitment to group decisions on settlement) to
coercive Vioxx-type threats of lawyer withdrawal. The legitimacy of
any of these approaches depends on the presence of governance
procedures to ensure that the gains from aggregation are joint gains.
A. Class Actions
Class actions are a regulatory response to the anticommons
problem in mass litigation. Much like eminent domain, class actions
reduce transaction costs by using state power to transfer rights from
low-value users (i.e., individual plaintiffs with small claims) to highvalue users (i.e., class counsel on behalf of the class as a whole).
Indeed, with small claims, individual prosecution or voluntary
aggregation may present insurmountable transaction costs. 2 44
Although their aggregate value may be considerable, without a
regulatory method of low-cost aggregation, plaintiffs may not be able
to extract any value from their claims. 245 Therefore, the task of class
action law should be to facilitate value-generating aggregation that
could not otherwise occur while at the same time ensuring that the
resulting surplus is fairly allocated among the class members, not
simply appropriated by a subset of the class or its agents (i.e., class
counsel).
Recognizing the anticommons in aggregate litigation can help
explain at least three features of class action law: the functional
inquiry that courts use for class certification, the differences in
244. The Supreme Court recognized this dynamic in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797 (1985). Due process requires only that plaintiffs be given an opportunity to opt out of a
class action because the additional transaction costs of requiring plaintiffs to affirmatively opt in
would swamp the surplus created by aggregation.
245. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 64, at 2145-46, 2162-63 (describing the class action rule
as the state's mechanism to get lawyers to subsidize access to courts for small claimants by
providing a low-cost method of assembling claims).
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treatment of mandatory and opt-out classes, and the differences in
treatment of settlement and litigation classes.
1. Functional Inquiry for Class Certification
The two-stage anticommons inquiry essentially tracks the
functional inquiry that courts undertake in deciding whether to certify
a class, that is: (1) whether the proposed class will create a surplus,
and (2) whether there are governance mechanisms in place to ensure
that all of the plaintiffs share in that surplus. The "commonality,"
"typicality," and "adequacy of representation" requirements for class
certification are laid out in separate subsections of Rule 23(a). But, as
the Supreme Court observed in General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, these
formal requirements "tend to merge" into a more functional two-stage
inquiry: "whether under the particular circumstances maintenance of
a class action is economical and whether the named plaintiffs claim
and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class
will be fairly and adequately protected in their absence." 246 The Rule
23(b)(3) requirements of "predominance" and "superiority" often
collapse into this functional inquiry as well.2 4 7
While there has been extensive academic focus on the second
stage-the governance structures necessary to ensure that absent
class members are protected-this commentary often overlooks the
antecedent question of whether the aggregation generates value. 2 4 8
The central inquiry at the first stage is whether class certification will
create a litigation unit at the appropriate scale-that is, the scale at
which there are efficiencies to be gained by litigating as a group and
the defendant might pay a peace premium for a complete settlement.
Thus appropriate class certification will create a genuine surplus over
disaggregated litigation, not merely shift leverage from the defendant
to the plaintiff class. 249
246. 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982).
247. Cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2561-62 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (accusing the majority of collapsing Rule 23(a) and (b) inquiries); Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 n.18 (1997) (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 76-77
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)) (noting that the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) are similar to the requirements of Rule 23(a)(3) in some respects).
248. See, e.g., NAGAREDA, supra note 34, at 220-23 (explaining the "governance problem" of
getting mass tort lawyers to faithfully represent the interests of the claimants whose rights they
seek to reform); Coffee, supra note 30 (describing "exit" and "voice" levers of litigation governance
by which class members can control their agents); Issacharoff, supra note 123, at 366-70
(discussing governance strategies to ensure faithful representation of absent class members).
249. Sometimes certification can destroy value if it results in a coerced settlement. If the
defendant succumbs to unfair settlement pressure to avoid a small chance of a catastrophic loss
(a possibility in some statutory-damages class actions, see Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and
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The Court's recent denial of class certification in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes250 demonstrates the functional inquiry into the
appropriate scale of the litigation unit at the first stage. The problem
there was that the plaintiffs sought to certify a class of all female
employees in all of Wal-Mart's stores nationwide to litigate a claim
that Wal-Mart's policy of leaving pay and promotion decisions up to
the discretion of individual local managers resulted in unlawful
gender-based discrimination. Defined at such a large scale the class
was not a sensible litigation unit because dissimilarities among the
plaintiffs' claims meant that they could not "productively be litigated
at once." 25 1 There may have been efficiency gains for smaller
groupings of similar claims. 252 And the defendant might have been
willing to pay a peace premium to completely resolve a smaller subset
of claims. But by lumping together so many dissimilar claims, the
proposed litigation unit was not framed at a scale for which the
defendant was likely to pay a peace premium. When litigating or
negotiating claims in bulk does not produce significant savings
because the claims are too dissimilar, a defendant does not face
disproportionate costs or risks from claims outside the aggregation
and consequently will not pay a premium for their inclusion.
Class certification might have benefited the plaintiffs by
shifting leverage in their favor, but it would not have driven the
litigation to a more efficient resolution. Thus, aggregate treatment of
all of Wal-Mart's female employees nationwide would be unlikely to
generate a surplus. The plaintiffs might even have been better off
bringing a series of similar claims in smaller-scale groupings-for
which they could capture a series of peace premiums-but their
lawyers sought the leverage and monopoly control that being class
counsel for a large-scale class action affords.
its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1872, 1885-85 (2006)) instead of paying a premium for peace, then certification is not
efficient (even if it benefits the class). The flip side of this scenario could also destroy value if
class counsel, seeking the monopoly control over all claims that class certification provides,
defines a class at too large a scale when plaintiffs would be better off pursuing a lower-risk
strategy of disaggregation.
250. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
251. Id. at 2551.
252. Cf. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 490-91
(7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012) (acknowledging the possibility that the
accuracy of the resolution might be enhanced through individual proceedings); Plaintiffs'
Opposition to Wal-Mart's Motion to Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint at 27, Dukes v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. C-01-2252-CRB (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012) (recognizing that partial
class certification may achieve greater judicial efficiencies than would broad class certification);
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 7, Odle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No.
3:11-cv-2954-0 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2012) (noting similar efficiency gains).
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Even if aggregate treatment will generate a surplus for the
relevant litigation unit, the use of a regulatory solution, like the class
action, to overcome the anticommons requires procedures at the
second stage to ensure that all class members will share in the joint
gains. Accordingly, as others have explained in detail, courts make a
functional inquiry at certification into the governance of the proposed
class to limit both agent opportunism and minority exploitation. 253
2. Mandatory Versus Opt-Out Classes
The anticommons also sheds light on the differential treatment
of mandatory and opt-out classes. Due process requires that plaintiffs
be given notice and an opportunity to opt out of classes seeking money
damages. 254 But groups of plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief can be
certified as mandatory classes with no opt-out rights. 255 This
difference is traditionally viewed from the perspective of the absent
plaintiffs; the lack of an opt-out right for injunctive relief is justified
by the homogeneity of the class and the identity of interests of the
class representative and absent class members. 256 But this view can
break down when class members' interests are not identical. 257
Viewed through the anticommons lens, however, mandatory
class treatment for injunctive relief makes perfect sense. An
injunction is a step good. 2 5 8 There is little value to the defendant in
resolving injunctive claims with part of the group because the last
plaintiff can obtain the same relief as the class as a whole. Thus for
true step goods, like injunctions, there is no use for opt-outs. All optouts can do is create the potential for intractable holdout problems. An
incomplete aggregation destroys the settlement value of the plaintiffs'
claims, as the defendant will pay next to nothing to settle for anything
253. E.g., Issacharoff, supranote 123, at 341-42, 381-85.
254. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
255. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
256. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 413 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[B]ecause of
the group nature of the harm alleged and the broad character of the relief sought, the (b)(2) class
is, by its very nature, assumed to be a homogenous and cohesive group with few conflicting
interests among its members.").
257. See, e.g., Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D.D.C. 1989) (certifying 23(b)(2) class
challenging juvenile curfew despite divergent views on whether curfew should be retained);
George Rutherglen, Better Late Than Never: Notice and Opt Out at the Settlement Stage of Class
Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 258, 272-73 (1996) (noting that whether a class is cohesive depends
upon the interests of the class members); Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and ProceduralDue Process
in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 347, 388 (1988) (noting that the absence
of an opt-out provision results in the trading away of "legitimate, enforceable interests of class
members").
258. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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less than total peace. Where a holdout's power is absolute, overriding
individual consent can be justified-just as eminent domain would be
justified to take a unique parcel of land needed to build a highway.259
The focus thus shifts to the second-stage concerns of governance
structures necessary to ensure fair treatment of all class members and
to limit agent opportunism.
Recognizing the anticommons dynamic thus helps explain why
the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart adopted a functional distinction
between divisible and indivisible remedies in determining when a
Rule 23(b)(2) mandatory class is appropriate instead of the traditional
distinction between legal and equitable relief.260 And it is easy to see
why the plaintiffs' monetary claims for back pay in Wal-Mart did not
justify mandatory class treatment despite their traditional
classification as an equitable remedy.261 If one, or even a handful, of
the plaintiffs had opted out, it would not have destroyed the value of
settlement for the defendant. The defendant might have been willing
to pay an additional premium for total peace (if the plaintiffs had
proposed a litigation unit at an appropriate scale), but settlement of
an incomplete aggregation could still generate some surplus.
3. Settlement Versus Litigation Classes
Finally, the anticommons can help explain the differential
treatment of settlement classes and litigation classes. When a class is
proposed for settlement purposes only, the functional inquiry into
certification can be quite different than for a litigation class (that is,
any class certified before settlement is reached, not just ones that
actually go to trial). Whereas the functional inquiry for a litigation
class asks first whether the aggregation will generate a surplus (as
opposed to merely shifting leverage) and second whether there are
governance procedures in place to ensure a fair allocation, when a
class is certified for settlement purposes only, the second-stage inquiry
becomes the primary focus. Because the parties have agreed that class
certification would be in the interests of both the plaintiffs and the
defendant, it can be presumed at the first stage that the aggregation

259. See Heller & Hills, supranote 136, at 1492-93 (asserting that eminent domain could be
used to seize land "where acquisition of the site is impeded by target uniqueness").
260. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011) (citing Richard A.
Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof,84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 132 (2009)); see
also AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION §§ 2.04, 2.07 (2010)
(discussing indivisible remedies versus divisible remedies).
261. 131 S. Ct. at 2557. The Court was unanimous in finding mandatory class treatment
inappropriate. Id. at 2561 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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generates value, unless-and this is a big unless-there is reason to
suspect collusion among the defendant and class counsel or certain
subgroups within the class. Thus for settlement classes, all the action
is in the second-stage governance inquiry.
In Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, for example, the
Supreme Court explained that in deciding whether to certify a
settlement class, a court need not consider whether the class would
"present intractable management problems." 262 The Rule 23
requirements "designed to protect absentees," on the other hand,
demand "undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement
context." 263 The Court's inquiry accordingly focused on the stage-two
concern that the settlement class lacked "structural assurance[s]" that
absent class members would be fairly treated in the allocation. 264
For litigation classes, by contrast, there is a risk that
certification will do more to shift leverage in favor of the plaintiffs
than to generate a surplus over individual litigation or voluntary
aggregation. Just as using eminent domain to defeat the anticommons
in land assembly can sometimes lead to inefficient takings, using a
regulatory solution like a class action can sometimes lead to inefficient
aggregation in litigation. Developers may use eminent domain even
where holdouts would not prevent land assembly because the
constitutional measure of just compensation does not require them to
pay the land owners any part of the assembly surplus. Lawyers,
likewise, might use class certification even where it will not induce the
defendant to pay a peace premium because it gives them a monopoly
over all of the plaintiffs' claims and shifts settlement leverage in their
favor. Where settlement leverage, not a peace premium, is the goal,
aggregation might not create a surplus over individual litigation (or
smaller aggregation).
In a settlement class, because the parties have agreed on the
class definition, the risk that the plaintiffs' lawyers are seeking
leverage through certification of a large and potentially overbroad
class, instead of identifying a unit of claims at the appropriate scale
for efficient resolution, is greatly reduced. The Third Circuit's recent
decision in Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc. is illustrative. 265 There the
court certified a nationwide antitrust class for settlement purposes
only, despite arguments that variations in the state laws applicable to

262.
263.
264.
265.
(2012).

521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997).
Id.
Id. at 627.
667 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. Murray v. Sullivan, 132 S. Ct. 1876
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different plaintiffs would have made a litigation class unmanageable
and that some of the plaintiffs lacked colorable claims under the
relevant state law. 266 The court took a functional approach to
certification, holding that a "global settlement"-even one including
claims that did not appear colorable and that could never be certified
for litigation purposes-would generate value. 2 67 The court explained:
"From a practical standpoint,

...

achieving global peace is a valid, and

valuable, incentive to class action settlements. Settlements avoid
future litigation with all potential plaintiffs-meritorious or not."2 68 In
other words, it was evident from the fact of settlement before
certification that the defendant was willing to pay a peace premium.
The court's inquiry thus turned to the second-stage considerations of
ensuring that the settlement was free of collusion and lawyer
opportunism and that the surplus it generated would be fairly
allocated among the plaintiffs. 269 Because it found that the settlement
class provided adequate structural protections for the interests of
differently situated plaintiffs and that the pro rata distribution
ensured that all class members fairly shared in the surplus, the court
found certification appropriate. 270
B. Nonclass Aggregate Settlements
Nonclass aggregate settlements are playing an increasingly
important role in mass litigation as class actions have become more
difficult to certify, especially in areas where plaintiffs have high-value
claims, such as mass torts. Recognizing the anticommons in aggregate
litigation sheds light on how attempts to facilitate nonclass aggregate
settlements should be evaluated. The same two-stage framework
applies to attempts to overcome the anticommons problem in nonclass
aggregate settlements. And just as governance is key to the legitimacy
of class actions and other anticommons solutions, governance plays an
important role in legitimizing nonclass aggregate settlements that
require plaintiffs to surrender some autonomy to achieve collective
gain.

266. Id. at 313.
267. Id. at 311.
268. Id.
269. Cf. id. at 313 n.44 (noting that settlement of invalid claims does not come at expense of
valid claims because total settlement fund is larger with peace premium).
270. Id. at 316, 327.
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1. ALI Proposal To Modify the Aggregate Settlement Rule
As discussed above, contractual efforts to overcome the
anticommons in aggregate litigation through precommitment to group
decisionmaking have run up against the aggregate settlement rule.27 '
By insisting on a particular view of litigant autonomy in which
plaintiffs must retain the individual ability to opt out of a group
settlement at the back end, the aggregate settlement rule limits
plaintiffs' opportunities to realize gains from cooperation. In other
words, it operates as a state-imposed transaction cost on market-based
attempts to facilitate value-generating aggregation.
As approaches taken in intellectual property and sovereign
debt demonstrate, there is nothing inherently suspect about
contractual precommitment strategies, so long as there are adequate
protections to ensure a fair allocation at the second stage. The ALI's
controversial proposal to modify the aggregate settlement rule can
thus be understood as an attempt to create a governance framework to
legitimize contractual efforts to defeat the anticommons in aggregate
litigation.
The ALI proposal would allow claimants sharing a common
lawyer in mass litigation to agree in advance to be bound by a
"substantial-majority vote" on whether to accept or reject a proposed
aggregate settlement. 272 Plaintiffs could thus precommit to a
representational structure that increases collective value at the first
stage by bundling their claims into a more valuable unit for sale to the
defendant. Much like collective action clauses in sovereign bonds, the
shift from the unanimity effectively required by the aggregate
settlement rule's ex post individual-consent provisions to a
supermajority-voting rule can generate value by allowing plaintiffs to
credibly offer the defendant finality and capture the resulting peace
premium.
But, as with the examples from other areas of law, the key to
any contractual solution's legitimacy in aggregate litigation is the
presence of adequate procedural protections to ensure fair allocation
at stage two. The ALI proposal would allow plaintiffs and their
lawyers the freedom, within certain limits, to contractually craft
private governance structures for making group decisions on
settlement and allocation, much like the plaintiffs in Abbot and Tax
Authority attempted to do. But, unlike previously attempted
271. See supra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
272. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17(b) (2010). The
ALI does not define "substantial majority," but suggests that the 75% required by Section 524(g)
of the Bankruptcy Code for asbestos creditors may serve as a model. Id. at cmt. c(2).
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contractual solutions and academic calls to allow waiver of the
aggregate settlement rule, the ALI proposal incorporates disclosure
requirements to ensure that precommitment is the product of
informed consent, and it explicitly builds in a backstop of judicial
review for both procedural and substantive fairness. 273
Despite the fact that it applies only to plaintiffs who
voluntarily opt in at the outset, the ALI proposal has engendered
fierce resistance. 274 Critics raise three primary objections: that
allowing plaintiffs to precommit to group decisionmaking will lead to
inadequate total settlements amounts, that it will result in unfair
allocations, and that clients cannot genuinely consent to such an
arrangement in advance. I will address these objections in turn.
First,critics argue that the need to obtain back-end settlement
approval from each client under the traditional aggregate settlement
rule constrains lawyers from settling the group's claims for an
inadequate total amount. 275 Viewed through the lens of the
anticommons, however, this objection largely falls away. Rather than
ensuring that lawyers bargain for an adequate overall amount, the
traditional aggregate settlement rule actually prevents lawyers from
maximizing the collective recovery for their clients because they
cannot capture the peace premium.
Just as collective action clauses in sovereign bonds do not
result in haircuts that leave the creditors worse off collectively
(assuming no collusion or side payments), 276 allowing group
decisionmaking on settlement offers should not result in lower total
settlement amounts at the first stage. Without collusion or side
payments, the supermajority of plaintiffs will have the same incentive

273. See id. §§ 3.17(a)-(b), 3.18. In explicitly providing for judicial review, the ALI proposal
is superior to an earlier proposal by Charles Silver (one of the ALI Reporters) and Lynn Baker to
allow wavier of the aggregate settlement rule. Silver & Baker, supra note 21, at 766-67; Charles
Silver & Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement
Proceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465, 1469 (1998). While their proposal would allow plaintiffs to
precommit to group decisionmaking, it relies solely on the plaintiffs to contract for governance
structures to ensure fair allocation. But, as the pre-bankruptcy era case law on private
restructuring demonstrates, because it is difficult to specify and contractually prohibit every
variety of opportunistic behavior, purely contractual protections may be insufficient without
some judicial backstop.
274. See supranote 9 (listing works critical of the ALI proposal).
275. E.g., Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 9, at 571 (stating that the client's
right to reject a settlement provides an important incentive to lawyers to negotiate adequate
settlements); Moore, Group Decisionmaking,supra note 9, at 406-07 (arguing that the aggregate
settlement rule serves as a necessary restraint on both inadequate settlements and unfair
allocations).
276. Bi, Chamon & Zettelmeyer, supra note 99, at 4, 16-17.
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to maximize the total recovery at the first stage as each individual
plaintiff.
This is not to say that the ALI proposal eliminates the agency
problem inherent in all legal representation. Lawyers may still be
tempted to act opportunistically and settle too cheaply under the ALI
proposal, just as in any contingent-fee arrangement where the lawyer
bears the full cost of further litigation but captures only part of the
expected benefit.277 But invalidating contractual precommitments is
counterproductive to maximizing aggregate recovery at stage one. The
supermajority has the same incentive to check lawyer opportunism as
the individual plaintiffs do. And other monitoring and bonding
devices, such as well-structured contingency fees and the threat of ex
post malpractice or breach-of-fiduciary-duty liability, can check lawyer
self-dealing without impeding the group's ability to maximize
aggregate recovery.
Contrasted with other strategies by which parties have
attempted to capture the peace premium, such as the lawyerwithdrawal features of the Vioxx settlement, the ALI proposal is more
likely to allow plaintiffs to maximize their aggregate recovery.
Strategies that deter opt-outs by destroying the value of claims
outside the aggregation-as the lawyer-withdrawal features of the
Vioxx settlement and their sovereign-debt analog, exit consents,
attempt to do-may succeed in obtaining complete participation, but
they shift leverage from the plaintiffs to the defendant and are likely
to result in a smaller total recovery (though often still better than a
deal that does not result in closure). 278 Plaintiffs who believe a
settlement offer is inadequate under a Vioxx-type framework can
choose to either accept the inadequate amount or opt out and have
their claims' value severely impaired. In other words, exit is
exceedingly unattractive and there is no opportunity for voice.
The supermajority-voting rules of the ALI proposal, on the
other hand, merely shift power from individual plaintiffs to the
group-not to the defendant or the lawyers. 279 Under the ALI
proposal, plaintiffs who believe an offer is inadequate can vote their
277. Additionally, with more at stake in the litigation than any individual client, the lawyer
may be more risk averse than the clients.
278. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text (contrasting collective action clauses
and exit consents); see also Bi, Chamon & Zettelmeyer, supra note 99, at 4, 17 (noting that while
both can achieve full participation that leaves the parties better off, collective action clauses
cannot sustain a haircut that leaves creditors worse off, while exit consents that are strongly
destructive of litigation prospects can coerce creditors into accepting a haircut higher than
necessary to restore solvency).
279. But see Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 299 ("ltimately, however, the ALI
proposal . . . shifts too much settlement power from the claimants to their lawyers.").
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true preferences without forfeiting the benefits of the settlement if it
is approved by the supermajority. While they may not exit the group
once they have committed, they have an important opportunity to
exercise voice to control their agents. 280
Second, critics argue that plaintiffs need an individual
opportunity to reject a settlement after learning all of its terms in
order to ensure a fair allocation.28 ' This objection is more substantial.
At first blush, the aggregate settlement rule might seem like a good
way to ensure equitable distribution. After all, the rights to accept or
reject a settlement offer are equally distributed among the plaintiffs.
Thus any plaintiff who believes the settlement is unfair may reject it.
This type of litigant autonomy affords each individual a defense
against exploitation because he or she can veto any settlement
distribution that makes him or her worse off. But this emphasis on
equity in the distribution of rights creates the transaction costs and
strategic dynamics that are characteristic of the anticommons and
destroys an opportunity for joint gain. 2 82 The more important
consideration is whether the gains created by aggregation are fairly
allocated at stage two; and there are likely better methods of
allocating a limited fund in a zero-sum game than giving each player a
veto over the whole deal.
This is where governance comes in. Just as governance can
legitimize the use of coercion in other areas of law, so long as
plaintiffs' precommitment is accompanied by a governance mechanism
that will ensure that the gains from complete aggregation are fairly
allocated, binding them to a group decision is unobjectionable.
The ALI proposal is largely silent on allocation, leaving choice
of method up to the creativity of lawyers and their clients, subject to
judicial review. 283 Plaintiffs and their lawyers might contractually
280. Cf. Burch, supra note 39, at 13-15, 24-25. Professor Burch argues that the opportunity
to exit a litigation group serves procedural justice goals and can signal whether a proposed
settlement is adequate and fair. But, as she acknowledges, Burch's form of "strategic
disaggregation" destroys plaintiffs' opportunities to offer the defendant peace and capture the
associated premium. Id. at 30. Further, because it would facilitate the formation of smaller, more
cohesive groups, id. at 18-19, disaggregation empowers holdout blocs to effectively destroy even
a deal that does not require complete participation. In the context of aggregate settlements, the
opportunity for effective voice through a meaningful vote can be more important-and may do
more to further procedural justice goals-than an opportunity for value-destroying or ineffective
exit.
281. See, e.g., Moore, Group Decisionmaking, supra note 9, at 408-09. A lawyer might
otherwise favor some clients, like those who retained him directly, over others, like those for
whom he will have to pay another lawyer a referral fee. See id.
282. See Heller, supra note 4, at 649-50 (noting that equity in initial distribution of rights
can lead to anticommons).
283. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION,

§ 3.17(b)(3)

(2010).
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design a number of potential mechanisms ranging from ex ante
agreement on allocation formulas or compensation grids to
appointment of a neutral special master to allocate funds after the
group accepts a settlement. The legitimacy of such private governance
structures depends largely on plaintiffs' informed consent at the
outset to be bound by them and the absence of structural deficiencies
that may systematically bias their outcome.
Perfect accuracy is not the touchstone. The process of allocating
an aggregate settlement will rarely be as straightforward as the
elegant approach of admiralty's general average contribution. 284 Some
degree of approximation will be inevitable in any settlement-allocation
procedure. But perfect accuracy in valuation and allocation is not
necessary for aggregation strategies to be acceptable, particularly
where the gains from accuracy are outweighed by the transaction
costs of achieving it. This can be seen in copyright collectives and
patent pools, which resort to pricing grids or royalty arbitration
procedures, 285 and in oil and gas unitization agreements, which base
allocation formulas on approximations. 286 And it remains true in
litigation, where the transaction-cost savings from approximation is
the very reason why settlement (aggregate or otherwise) generates
value over trial.
The key to ensuring a fair allocation process at stage two is
attention to the two governance concerns: preventing the majority
from exploiting the minority and limiting agent opportunism. Private
parties voluntarily contracting in advance on an allocation procedure
should have a great deal of flexibility in its design. And by designing a
procedure before there is money on the table, plaintiffs may take
advantage of a partial veil of ignorance in reaching agreement on
what sort of allocation scheme would be fair, just as oil and gas
companies find it easier to negotiate unitization agreements during
the exploration phases. 287 Plaintiffs will rarely be totally ignorant of
the relative strength of their claims, of course, but an ex ante
agreement on allocation procedures is more likely to be fair than
waiting until facts are developed, settlement offers have been made,
and heterogeneities have emerged. 288 Indeed, plaintiffs may be able to
284. See supranotes. 145-51 and accompanying text.
285. See Merges, supra note 193, at 1328, 1342-43.
286. See supra notes 184-190 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
288. Uhl v. Thoroughbred Technology and Telecommunications, Inc., 309 F.3d 978 (7th Cir.
2002), provides a rare example of an allocation procedure designed behind a true veil of
ignorance. There, landowners sued a company that hoped to lay fiber-optic cable along a railroad
right-of-way abutting their property, but at the time of the settlement, it was unclear on which.
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agree on a governance structure that makes every individual better off
from an ex ante perspective, given the expected surplus from
aggregation and each individual's expected share in the allocation.
But the governance structures must account for heterogeneities
among the plaintiffs. Voting procedures should be designed with the
potential for minority exploitation in mind, and may require steps
such as subclassing to account for significant differences among
groups of plaintiffs that could create conflicts of interest. This point
requires particular attention because the ALI proposal contemplates
assigning voting power on a per-client basis, not in proportion to the
value of plaintiffs' claims. 289 This per capita approach differs from the
approaches taken in sovereign bond collective action clauses, which
allocate both voting power and shares in the recovery pro rata,290 and
in bankruptcy, where votes are allocated on a hybrid pro rata and per
capita basis. 291 The danger in allocating votes per capita is that
plaintiffs with small claims might vastly outnumber those with large
claims and might vote to accept a settlement that fully compensates
small claimants, but leaves large claimants undercompensated. 292
With sovereign bonds, the relative value of bondholders' claims
is usually evident from the face of the instruments, and bankruptcy
relies on a claims-allowance process to value claims and assign voting
rights accordingly before any vote on the reorganization occurs.293 In
cases where clients are able to accurately estimate the relative value
of their claims in advance (like investors suing for fraud), they should
be permitted to depart from the ALI's default per capita voting rule
and contractually assign voting power pro rata or in whatever manner
is best suited for their particular situation.294
side of the track the cable would be installed. Thus, without knowing which category any
individual would fall into, the parties designed a settlement that gave greater compensation to
landowners on the cable side. The court upheld the settlement as fair to all class members.
289. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION,

§ 3.17(b),

cmt. (c)(2)

(2010).
290. See supranotes 208-09 and accompanying text.
291. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2006) (specifying that approval of a reorganization plan by a
creditor class requires an affirmative vote of creditors holding claims that in aggregate represent
at least two-thirds in amount, and more than one-half in number, of the allowed claims held by
creditors in that class). Additionally, for certain asbestos bankruptcies, section 524(g), which
served as a model for the ALI proposal, requires the approval on a per capita basis of 75% of
asbestos claimants. Id. § 524(g).
292. Even worse, a per capita voting rule might encourage referring lawyers to drum up
junk claims to increase their inventories to the point where they can form a blocking position and
hold out for a greater share of the allocation.
293. See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512, 515 (N.J. 2006)
(describing one example of an agreement to distribute voting power pro rata).
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But in many types of aggregate litigation, it may be
impracticable to obtain precise valuations of individual plaintiffs'
claims before settlement (and may undermine many of the efficiencies
of settling in the first place). Still, some limited evaluation of claims in
advance may be necessary to group truly dissimilar plaintiffs into
subgroups for voting purposes. The key is to ensure that the voting
process is free of the sorts of structural conflicts of interest that might
allow a group of plaintiffs making up a majority to exploit some
minority group. 295
As the ALI anticipates, defendants may provide some guidance
on proper subgroups by demanding certain thresholds of participation
by certain sets of plaintiffs. 296 But this creates a risk that the
defendant might try to gerrymander subgroups in its own favor by, for
example, placing the plaintiffs with the strongest claims into classes
where they are likely to be outvoted by plaintiffs with weaker
claims. 297 Alternatively, plaintiffs could play an active role in forming
their own subgroups, which, as Professor Elizabeth Chamblee Burch
suggests, might further procedural justice goals. 2 9 8 Indeed,
participation in the governance of group litigation-through
deliberation, crafting an intragroup governance agreement, and
voting-may even prove an important substitute for the increasingly
unrealistic "day in court" in terms of plaintiffs' satisfaction with the
entire litigation process. 2 99
The presence of a judicial backstop can also help legitimize
enforcing plaintiffs' precommitment to group decisionmaking by
providing an independent check on majority exploitation and agent
opportunism. The ALI proposal calls for judicial review of both the
procedural and substantive fairness of a settlement approved by
supermajority vote. But this marks a departure from normal practice,
and the source of the court's authority to engage in such review is not
self-evident. 300 Courts generally lack the power to review private
settlements outside of a formally certified class.301 But courts
295. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, § 2.07(a)(1),
cmt. d & Reporters' Note (2010) (explaining structural conflicts of interest).
296. Id. §3.17(b).
297. Cf. Hagan, supra note 66, at 381-82 (discussing the risk of "gerrymandering" in the
sovereign debt context).
298. Burch, supra note 5, at 525-27.

299. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal
Obligations, 91 B.U. L. REV. 87, 132-34 (2011).
300. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, § 3.01
cmt. a (discussing the limited or nonexistent role courts play in private nonclass settlements).
301. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(A); see also Gardiner v. A.H. Robins Co., 747 F.2d 1180, 1189
(8th Cir. 1984) ("[Clourts recognize that settlement of the dispute is solely in the hands of the
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sometimes engage in such review anyway-ranging from scrutiny of
settlements reached prior to class certification (despite an explicit
amendment to Rule 23(e) to the contrary)30 2 to the rejection of
nonclass aggregate settlements "as not fair and adequate" under a
"quasi-class action" theory. 303 These assertions of judicial authority
have, understandably, been subject to criticism, 304 and a formal rule
change explicitly authorizing judicial review may be desirable. In the
context of contractual attempts to overcome an anticommons problem,
however, the need to protect the minority, control agency costs, and
ensure a fair allocation of the surplus may justify judicial intervention
in private settlements as an exercise of the court's equitable power,
just as the need to prevent collusion and self-dealing by the majority
justified judicial scrutiny of private bond workouts in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 305
The contours of judicial review should follow the same
functional two-stage inquiry that courts apply in reviewing other
attempts to overcome anticommons problems, such as in oil and gas
unitization and class actions. 306 But the primary focus of judicial
review of aggregate settlements should be on procedural fairness.
That is, courts should focus on the presence of informed consent and
the absence of structural conflicts of interest, collusion, exploitation of
minorities, and self-dealing by lawyers. Substantive review of the
fairness of the settlement should be deferential, so long as the process
parties."); 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
2363 (3d ed. 2008) (discussing voluntary dismissal).
302. E.g., Elliot v. Allstate Investigators, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 6078 (DLC), 2008 WL 728648, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2008); Ramirez v. Cintas Corp., No. C 04-00281 JSW, 2007 WL 4410414,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2007); Mansourian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Cal. at Davis, No. Civ.
S-03-2591 FCD EFB, 2007 WL 1722975, at *1 (E.D. Cal. June 12, 2007). But see 7B WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 301, § 1797 ("[S]ettlements or voluntary dismissals that occur before class
certification are outside the scope of [Rule 23](e)."). Some courts have found authority under
other provisions of Rule 23 to engage in limited review of precertification settlements for
collusion or prejudice to absent parties. See, e.g., Shelton v. Pargo, Inc., 582 F.2d 1298, 1314-15
(4th Cir. 1978) (relying on Rules 23(c)(1) and 23(d)); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION,
FOURTH §§ 21.312, 21.61 (Stanley Marcus et al. eds., 2004).
303. In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 834 F. Supp. 2d 184, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(citing Transcript of Status Conference of March 19, 2010 at 54-64, In re World Trade Ctr.
Disaster Site Litig., 21 MC 100 (Doc. No. 2037) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010)).
304. See, e.g., Alexandra N. Rothman, Bringing an End to the Trend: Cutting Judicial
"Approval" and "Rejection" Out of Non-Class Mass Settlements, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 321
(2011) (noting that review of a mass settlement absent class certification "stretches the
judiciary's power and stifles litigants' rights in mass action"); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Quasi-ClassAction Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: Problems and a
Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 173 (2010) (addressing concerns about the current regime of
judicial discretion).
305. See supra notes 227-43 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 186-190, 246-49 and accompanying text.
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was fair. Otherwise judicial review could turn into just another
opportunity for holdouts to attempt to extract a larger share of the
allocation.
Third, critics argue that the aggregate settlement rule is
needed to protect client autonomy so that clients are free to decide for
themselves whether a proposed settlement would maximize their own
welfare. But the central insight from recognizing the anticommons in
aggregate litigation is that sometimes a loss of autonomy can be
welfare enhancing. By voluntarily surrendering their autonomy to the
group, clients can enhance their own welfare.
Critics counter that clients are not capable of validly
consenting to a waiver of the aggregate settlement rule at the outset of
representation or, indeed, at any time prior to learning the terms of a
settlement offer. They argue that, without knowing the actual terms of
the settlement offer, plaintiffs cannot understand and consent to the
conflicts of interest inherent in aggregate settlements and mass
representation more generally. Plaintiffs, instead, think they are
hiring (or being referred to) a lawyer who will represent them with
undivided loyalty and avoid situations where tradeoffs must be made
among clients (inevitable in any settlement allocation). 307 Further,
critics argue that, if lawyers are allowed (as they would be under the
ALI proposal) to insist on clients' advanced consent to be bound by a
group decision on settlement as a condition of joining an aggregate
representation, then all lawyers will do so, effectively leaving
plaintiffs with no alternative. 308
This objection, however, takes a very narrow view of litigant
autonomy in insisting that plaintiffs can never be free to bind
themselves to a group decision to defeat the anticommons but must,
instead, always retain individual control over their claims. 309 While
judicial review of the adequacy and fairness of an aggregate
settlement alone may not be enough to lend it legitimacy absent
consent, it is difficult to see why a client informed of the inherent
conflicts of interest in group representation and its benefits and
drawbacks could not validly consent to such an arrangement.
307. See, e.g., Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 298-311.
308. Id. at 302-03. On this point, critics may be correct. Contingent-fee lawyers stand to
gain the most from the ability to offer defendants finality because the lawyers' stake in most
aggregate litigation (typically 30-40% of the total recovery) will dwarf that of any individual
plaintiff. If there were real demand for representation under the traditional aggregate
settlement rule, however, one would expect the market to make such representation availableperhaps at a different price.
309. Cf. Robert L. Scharff, A Common Tragedy: Condemnation and the Anticommons, 47
NAT. RESOURCES J. 165, 186-88 (2007) (showing that autonomy may still be respected when
individuals opt into binding private governance regiines to solve anticommons problems).
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To the extent that critics contend that clients who consent in
advance are not adequately informed, 310 the disclosure requirements
of the ALI proposal and the prospect of judicial review should serve as
an information-forcing mechanism. Clients are too often uninformed
about the essentially collective nature of mass representation and the
inevitable conflicts of interest it entails under current rules. With no
prospect of judicial review lawyers often fail to explain, and obtain
consent to, those conflicts despite existing ethical obligations to do
so. 311 If, however, the enforceability of an aggregate settlement (and
therefore the lawyer's entitlement to a contingency fee) is conditioned
on a judicial determination that the lawyers' disclosures when
obtaining the client's consent were adequate, the lawyer will have a
powerful incentive to disabuse the client of any notion that the
collective representation operates under the same presumptions of
undivided lawyer loyalty as the individual-representation paradigm.
Further, clients can take advantage of existing referral networks that
channel similar claims to a handful of lead lawyers. Referring lawyers,
who are typically the primary client contacts, are well positioned to
advise individuals on whether to waive the protections of the
traditional aggregate settlement rule in favor of joining a litigation
group.
To the extent critics say that even informed consent should not
be honored, 312 such paternalism is difficult to justify when it will
prevent the very clients it is trying to protect from cooperating to
maximize the value of their claims. Certainly it is true that a lawyer
representing a group of clients that must allocate a limited fund
among themselves in a zero-sum game cannot simultaneously
zealously represent the interests of each individual. 313 But such a oneon-one model is not the only legitimate conception of representation.
Corporate and political agents legitimately represent groups all the
time. And the problem of equitably allocating a limited fund has been
solved in many other contexts. 314 As examples from intellectual
property and sovereign debt demonstrate, private parties often find it
advantageous to voluntarily surrender their autonomy and join groups
310. E.g., Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 301-03.
311. See, e.g., Erichson, Beyond the Class Action, supra note 9, at 562 ("Rarely, however, do
mass litigators seek their clients' consent to the inherent client-client conflicts of interest in mass
collective representation."); Moore, Absence of Legal Ethics, supra note 9, at 731 ("Under rules of
professional conduct, individual clients must be fully informed.").
312. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 9, at 304 ("[Aldvance consent should not be permitted
because the conflicts inherent in most aggregate settlements are nonconsentable in advance.").
313. Id. at 307-11.
314. See supra Part III.
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as a way of overcoming collective action problems. The key is to ensure
that those groups are governed by fair processes. Clients should be
allowed, to choose group representation and agree upon a fair
allocation process, so long as there are protections in place to prevent
minority exploitation and agent self-dealing.
2. Toward a More Comprehensive Contractual Solution to the
Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation
While the ALI proposal to eliminate what is essentially a stateimposed transaction cost can help facilitate some market-driven
attempts to overcome the anticommons in aggregate litigation, it is, at
best, an incomplete solution.
Even without the restrictions of the aggregate settlement rule,
plaintiffs cannot offer defendants complete peace when they are
represented by more than one lawyer. Thus, a second-order
anticommons dynamic may be replicated among lawyers representing
groups of clients, much like the dynamic created by collective action
clauses whose effect is limited to one of many series of a sovereign
issuer's bonds. There is some hope that because those lawyers are
likely to be a handful of repeat players, they may be able to find ways
to overcome the second-order anticommons through negotiation or by
creating structures like coalitions or ad hoc law firms to limit strategic
behavior; indeed, they have successfully done so in several instances.
But the risk of holdouts remains and could be exacerbated if some
firms began to adopt a "vulture-fund model" of acquiring and
coordinating an inventory of claims sufficient to form a blocking
position in any global settlement for the purpose of holding out. 3 1 5
A more comprehensive contractual approach might allow
voting across plaintiff groups much like aggregated collective action
clauses allow voting across series of bonds. For example, all of the
plaintiffs (and their separate lawyers) with similar claims against a
common defendant might agree to be bound by, say, an 85% vote in
favor of a global settlement, so long as the settlement was also
approved by a two-thirds vote of the plaintiffs represented by each

315. The ALI proposal also does not solve the "temporal anticommons" presented by future
claimants who have been exposed to a harm but have not manifested any injury at the time of an
aggregate settlement. This temporal dimension creates new transaction costs: property rights
are not only disaggregated across multiple claimants, but also across time. If future claimants
cannot be identified, the costs of assembling all present and future claims into a collective that
could credibly offer peace and thus be sold to the defendant at a premium would far exceed any
premium the defendant would be willing to pay.
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lawyer. 316 Such an approach may help resolve the second-order
anticommons among groups of plaintiffs.
Negotiating the agreement to bind each lawyer's clients to a
vote by the larger group could no doubt prove difficult. But the
plaintiffs' bar already has some structures in place for coordination in
mass litigation, such as informal coalitions of law firms, ad hoc law
firm mergers, or more formal arrangements that automatically bring
"super law firms" into existence when a member firm gets a case of a
certain size. 317 And coordination within the framework of an MDL
could help groups of plaintiffs reach an agreement to further
aggregate their claims in order to maximize both their negotiating
position with the defendant and their ability to offer extra value in the
form of complete peace.
The legitimacy of attempts at such a comprehensive solution
would, of course, turn on the fairness of the procedures for allocating
the surplus at the second stage. For the most part, it is safe to assume
that sophisticated parties like lawyers would contract for the
protections they need when designing the structures that would
govern their relationships within the larger litigation group. But
governance would be complicated by the presence of intermediariesthe lawyers-whose interests may not always align with those of their
clients, adding an additional layer of agency costs. 3 18 And obtaining
the informed consent of all of the plaintiffs would be key to the
legitimacy of any such arrangement. Therefore, judicial scrutiny
would be necessary, both to ensure the informed consent of plaintiffs
and to limit collusion and agent opportunism.
CONCLUSION

Recognizing the anticommons dynamic can lend insight into
some of the collective action problems that plaintiffs face in aggregate
litigation, and can help identify areas where the law imposes artificial
transaction costs that stand in the way of aggregation strategies that
could leave everyone involved better off. But it is also important to
recognize the two-stage dynamic characteristic of attempts to
overcome anticommons problems, which can provide a framework for
316. This essentially tracks the structure of Uruguay's aggregated collective action clause.
See Buchheit & Gulati, Model CAC, supra note 60, at 319.
317. See Erichson, Beyond the ClassAction, supranote 9, at 536-39.
318. See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 63, at 1590-96 (describing advantages and perils of
claims brokers and interpreters who served as intermediaries in early employee injury cases).
For discussion of a similar problem in a different context, see Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R.
Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries,85 VA. L. REV. 1627 (1999).
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evaluating both regulatory and contractual strategies for addressing
collective action problems in aggregate litigation. On these metrics,
the ALI proposal to allow waiver of the aggregate settlement rule
appears to be a step in the right direction. But the anticommons
framework may prove useful in broader applications.
Some of the more complicated problems facing parties and
courts today are how to coordinate mass litigation in MDL
proceedings, where formally separate claims are brought together in
the same forum before the same judge, but with surprisingly little
established law on how they should proceed. Courts have instinctively
looked to class action procedures for guidance, but it is not at all clear
that class actions are the appropriate model. Recognizing the
anticommons in aggregate litigation, some of the pathologies it
creates, and some of the solutions that have been attempted in other
areas of law may help provide guidance. Looking first to whether
aggregation will produce joint gains and second to whether
governance structures are in place to ensure that all of the parties
share in the resulting surplus and are not exploited by their agents or
the majority may be potentially useful organizing principles for
evaluating attempts at coordination among the various groups of
plaintiffs and lawyers in an MDL. As the class action fades into the
background, we should not be alarmed by innovations that emerge to
deal with some of the problems that the class action addressed. With
proper attention to problems of cooperation and governance, voluntary
nonclass aggregation has the potential to lead to more efficient and
fair results than individual litigation and perhaps even than
regulatory aggregation through class actions.

